THE PRESIDENCY
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

DEPARTMENT: PERFORMANCE MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Impact and Implementation Evaluation of Government Coordination Systems:

Final Report: Policy Summary, Executive Summary and Short Report

6 February 2014

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ..... **i**

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..... **iii**

PREFACE ..... **v**

FORMAT OF THE REPORT ..... **vi**

POLICY SUMMARY ..... **vii**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..... **ix**

1. Introduction **1**

1.1 Background to the evaluation 1
1.2 Evaluation purpose and scope 1
1.3 Report structure 2
1.4 Methodology 2

2. Background and Context **4**

2.1 The cluster, IF, and MinMEC system 4
2.2 Key coordination concepts: definitions, reasons to coordinate, approaches and tools 6
2.3 Analytical framework 10
2.4 Lessons from the international case studies for South Africa 11
2.5 Theories of change for the South African cluster system/MinMECs/IFs 13
2.6 The findings of the 2008 Presidency report on clusters 13

3. Coordination Case Studies **14**

4. Findings: How well are the coordination systems working overall? **16**

4.1 Mandates 16
4.2 Systems and processes 19
4.3 Behaviour 21

5. Conclusions and recommendations **23**

5.1 Number of meetings 23
5.2 Quality of secretariats 24
5.3 Leadership, problem-solving, accountability and weak coordination culture: 26
5.4 Recommendations for specific structures 29

Annexes **31**

Annex 1: References 31
Annex 2: Glossary 37
Annex 3: Detailed Methodology 40
Annex 4: Detailed Coordination Analytic Framework 46
Annex 5: Coordination Case Studies 47
1. Case study 1: Regulation of independent power producers (IPPs) 47
2. Case study 2: Education Implementation Forum/MinMEC; Learner, teacher, support materials (LTSM) (textbooks) 50
3. Case study 3: Human Settlements Implementation Forum/ MinMEC: Accreditation of Metros with the Housing Function 53
4. Case study 4: Finalisation of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA): Environment MinMEC 56

List of figures

Figure 1: Three categories of coordination mechanism 9
Figure 2: Factors and enablers of successful coordination 10
Figure 3: Clusters respondent participates in 42
Figure 4: Implementation forum the respondent participates in 42
Figure 6: Selected SA Government Coordination Case Studies 43

List of tables

Table 1: Relationship between implementation forums, clusters and MinMECs 5
Table 2: Key success factors and challenges in the case studies 14
Table 3: DG Survey Coordination Structure Decision-Making Effectiveness 17
Table 4: DG Survey Summary of Coordination Structure Meeting Management Effectiveness 20
Table 5: DG Survey Summary of Participation and Representation Issues 22
Table 6: Key informant interviews conducted 41

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

APP	Annual Performance Plan
APS	Australian Public Service
ASIDI	Accelerated Schools Infrastructure Initiative
CAF	Committee of Federative Affairs (Brazil)
CANASEMS	National Council of the Municipal Health Secretaries (Brazil)
CEM	Council of Education Ministers
CIB	Bipartite Inter-Manager Commission (Brazil)
CIT	Tripartite Inter-Managers Commission (Brazil)
CIU	Cabinet Implementation Unit (Australia)
CNE	National Educational Council (Brazil)
COAG	Council of Australian Government (Australia)
CONARES	National Council of State Representatives (Health. Brazil)
CONFAZ	National Council for Fiscal Policy (Brazil)
DA	Delivery Agreement
DBE	Department of Basic Education
DDG	Deputy Director General
DG	Director General
DoE	Department of Energy
DORA	Division of Revenue Act 2012
DPE	Department of Public Enterprises
DPME	Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (SA Presidency)
DPSA	Department of Public Services and Administration
dti	Department of Trade and Industry
EA	Environmental Assessment
ECA	Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EMPs	Environmental Management Plans
EPC	Energy Portfolio Committee
ERA	Energy Regulations Act No. 4 of 2006
ESEID	Economic Sector, Employment and Infrastructure Development Cabinet Committee
FOSAD	Forum of South African Directors General
G&A	Governance & Administration
Headcom	Meetings of heads of national and provincial education departments
IF	Implementation Forum
IGR	Inter-governmental Relations
IGRA	Inter-Governmental Relations Act 13 of 2005 (South Africa)
IDC	Infrastructure Development Cluster
IMC	Inter-Ministerial Committee
IPP	Independent Power Producer
JCPS	Justice, Crime Prevention, and Security Cluster
JUG	Joined up Government
KPI	Key performance indicator
LOLT	Language of Teaching and Learning
LTSM	Learner, Teacher, Support Materials
MEC	Member of the Executive Council (Provincial cabinet member)
MFMA	Municipal Financial Management Act
MinMEC	Inter-governmental structure involving representatives from national, provincial, and local government at Ministerial level
MinTECH	Inter-governmental structure involving representatives from national, provincial, and local government at technical/ official level
MoA	Memorandum of Agreement
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPAT	Management Performance Assessment Tool
MPRDA	Mineral and Petroleum Resources Act 28 of 2002
MSA	Municipal Systems Act
MTSF	Medium Term Strategic Framework

NCOP	National Council of Provinces
NDHS	National Department of Human Settlements
NDP	National Development Plan 2030 (South Africa)
NEDLAC	National Economic Development and Labour Council
NEAF	National Environmental Advisory Forum
NEMA	National Environmental Management Act 73 of 1998
NEP	National Evaluation Plan
NEPF	National Evaluation Policy Framework
NERSA	National Energy Regulator of South Africa
NES	National Evaluation System
NPM	New Public Management
NT	National Treasury
OTP	Office of the Premier
PEDs	Provincial Education Departments
PFMA	Public Finance Management Act
PICC	Presidential Infrastructure Coordinating Committee
PoA	Programme of Action (South Africa)
SACMEC	Southern and East African Consortium for Monitoring Education Quality
SASAMS	Schools Administration and Management System
SEU	Social Exclusion Unit (United Kingdom)
SGBs	School Governing Bodies
SMS	Senior Management Service
SU	Strategy Unit (United Kingdom)
ToC	Theory of Change
TOR	Terms of Reference

PREFACE

The National Evaluation Policy Framework (NEPF) (2011) sets out the basis for government-wide evaluation focusing on government's priority outcomes. It is intended to establish a culture of continuous improvement in service delivery. The key elements of the Framework are the basis of the National Evaluation System (NES), part of which is the National Evaluation Plan (NEP) which is rolled each year. The approach taken in the NES is to use evaluations for learning and improving programme (and policies) performance rather than as a punitive measure.

The purpose of the NES as outlined in the NEPF (2011) is to:

1. Improve policy or programme performance (evaluation for continuous improvement). This aims to provide feedback to programme managers.
2. Evaluate for improving accountability - for instance. is public spending making a difference?
3. Improve decision-making e.g. should an intervention be continued? Should how it is implemented be changed? Should increased budget be allocated?
4. Evaluate for generating knowledge (for learning): increasing knowledge about what works and what does not with regard to a public policy, programme, function or organisation.

These four purposes are in accordance with the National Development Plan 2030 which emphasises the need for greater professionalization of the civil service, as well as improvement in the quality of service delivery if the main outcomes of the plan namely, eliminating poverty and reducing inequality are to be achieved. Within this context the South African government recognises the importance of evaluations and supports the active use of evaluation findings to adjust and enhance departmental policies, strategies and work plans.

The evaluations are implemented by the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) in partnership with the relevant (service delivery) department (if any). This is managed through an evaluation Steering Committee. Members of the steering committee may not necessarily agree with the results of the evaluation, but their role is to ensure that an independent, credible evaluation process was followed. Following the evaluation the relevant departments are required to provide a management response indicating their position on the evaluation findings.

The Implementation Evaluation of Government Coordination Systems is part of the National Evaluation Plan for 2013/14.

FORMAT OF THE REPORT

The report consists of several sections:

- A one-page Policy Summary, summarising the key policy findings and recommendations.
- A seven page Executive Summary, which covers all sections of the main report (and uses the numbering in the main report so the reader can cross-refer).
- A 25+ page full evaluation report including:
    - Background.
    - Approach/methodology.
    - International case study lessons summary.
    - Results and findings.
    - Conclusions and recommendations.

In addition, the following separate reports have been produced as part of the evaluation process:

- A long evaluation report containing more detailed evidence.
- International coordination case studies report.
- Data annexure report containing detailed data on the three coordination systems, including additional quotes from key informants interviewed by analytric framework theme.

This shorter 1/7/25 page report allows for a one page outline of the main messages that have come from the research, a seven page executive summary and 25 pages to present the findings and methodology used in a language that is clear and accessible to the non-research specialist and/or for those who may not have time to read the full report.

This report has been independently prepared by Impact Economix, reporting to an Evaluation Steering Committee. The Evaluation Steering Committee comprises The Presidency, Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation in The Presidency, Office of the Public Service Commission, Department of Cooperative Governance. The Steering Committee oversaw the operation of the evaluation and commented and approved the reports.

Contact Information:
Impact Economix
Po Box 13446
Mowbray 7705
Cape Town
Tel. +27 21 685 9663
www.impacteconomix.com

Contact Person:
Rae Wolpe
Cellular: 076 8199 886.
rae@impacteconomix.com

POLICY SUMMARY

The Presidency commissioned this evaluation to assess the performance of coordination systems in government, both technical and ministerial, and to see how to strengthen their effectiveness. The evaluation focused on clusters, MinMECs and outcome Implementation Forums (IFs). The evaluation was informed by a survey of directors-general (DGs), interviews with 38 DGs and 4 Ministers, as well as analysis of minutes and was undertaken from March - November 2013.

Co-ordination is meant to lead to improved performance across the chain of policy development and implementation. Coordination is meant to enhance outcomes, particularly government's impact on society. The National Development Plan points to the need for a developmental state with the organisational and technical capacity to lead society on a high trajectory of growth and development, and with a Centre capable of directing government as a whole and ensuring intra- and inter-governmental integrated and mutually-reinforcing actions.

There are indications that the coordination structures are not optimally meeting their roles and mandates. Only 54% of DGs felt that participants at clusters were adequately prepared for meetings, only 50% felt that the quality of decisions was good, while only 32% felt there was good accountability for implementing cluster decisions.

Key recommendations from the evaluation include:

Number of meetings:

1. The **number** of coordination structure meetings needs to be reduced. Some recommendations include The Presidency engaging with Parliament to agree on days on which departments and Ministers will not be called to Parliament, and reducing Programme of Action (PoA) reporting periods from 4 per annum to 3 per annum. Other possible options include: A) reduce number of clusters B) reduce numbers of departments participating in each cluster C) do away with Ministerial Clusters and only have Cabinet committees.

Weak coordination structure secretariat functions:

2. The **coordination structure secretariat role** should not be seen as administrative but a high level organisational role requiring at least one dedicated senior official. The job descriptions should be revised by the Presidency working with the clusters to reflect this role.
3. Refined **Terms of Reference (ToRs)** should be developed by the Presidency for all structures which clarify the difference in roles, as well as the core mandates they should focus on. The need for guidelines and terms of reference should be backed up by The Presidency to support and ensure compliance.
4. The **Presidency**[1] should play a stronger role in supporting structure secretariats and the coordination structures in a number of areas including the pro-active identification of key implementation blockages and policy coherence issues, raising these within and outside the coordination structures, and working to ensure that blockages are resolved. This includes setting minimum capacity and competency requirements for secretariats, training, monitoring and supporting the secretariats.

Lack of leadership, problem-solving, accountability and weak coordination culture:

5. For coordination to be effective ministers have to take a lead.
6. The **chairing** of meetings needs to be improved. It would assist if chairpersons of clusters/IFs were the dominant actor/department in that area. Specific training should be organised for ministers and senior public servants covering chairing, coordination and problem-solving.
7. Coordination between the coordinating structures is also an issue. This is important for ensuring policy coherence across government. The Presidency should identify issues requiring

[1] Note that the Presidency is used to include DPME and the National Planning Commission Secretariat.

coordination between structures and set up and lead issue-specific task teams to deal with such issues.

8. All departments need to ensure that performance agreements cascade down from ministerial, DG, to at least chief director levels, and that these include **stronger performance indicators** and targets for coordinated outputs**/**outcomes, and problem-solving.
9. Wherever possible DGs need to give **delegated powers** to officials to address coordination issues outside of the cluster structures. This includes the establishment of task teams to work on specific issues. Issues should only be brought to the structures if attempts to address these outside of the coordination structures have been ineffective.
10. Ministers need to hold **DGs accountable** when departments do not report on progress to the coordination structures and/or to Cabinet committees.
11. Improvements are needed to the **PoA** progress reporting system to ensure they are focusing on a limited number of top government priority items, and refining the role of Cabinet committees in the process. It is suggested above that the frequency of reporting is dropped to 3 times a year.
12. **Specific decisions** need to be taken to clarify and confirm the relationship between the **Presidential Infrastructure Coordinating Committee's (PICC)** Management Committee and the Outcome 6 Technical and Ministerial IFs (for example, should the Outcome 6 Technical IF support the PICC Management Committee, is the Outcome 6 Ministerial Forum needed in addition to the PICC Management Committee?).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1-3 An impact and implementation evaluation of Government Coordination Systems was undertaken as part of the National Evaluation Plan for 2013/14. Improved coordination is regarded as having an important contribution to make towards ongoing improvements to government service delivery. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess the performance of coordination systems in government, both technical and ministerial, and to see how to strengthen their effectiveness. The focus was on national-level technical and ministerial clusters, MinMECs and Implementation Forums (IFs) and not on other coordination systems.

1.4 A multi-method approach was undertaken to collect a range of qualitative and quantitative data on coordination success factors. Evidence was obtained from various sources including: a literature review of international coordination case studies; interviews with 4 Ministers and 38 directors general (DGs) and senior government officials; a survey of 34 DGs; four issue-specific case studies; an analysis of the decisions taken by the 3 coordination structures between June 2011–July 2013; and levels of attendance at meetings from 2011-2013.

2 BACKGROUND

2.1 Clusters do not have a statutory mandate but coordinate policy issues before going to Cabinet. Implementation Forums coordinate and monitor the delivery agreements for the 12 outcomes, some of which are based on clusters, some on the national-provincial MinMEC structures. MinMECs (and MinTECHs at DG level) are sectoral meetings of national ministers and provincial members of executive committees (MECs) around concurrent functions. MinMECs are the only one of the three structures with a mandate through legislation (the IGR Act 13 of 2005).

2.2 This report defines coordination and shows it as a continuum between collaboration (shared responsibility, risks and rewards), networking (exchange of information) coordination (shared work), and cooperation (shared resources). Coordination is necessary when "an outcome can only be improved or attained through coordinated government action, and when the benefits…outweigh the costs…. But coordination takes time, resources and energy, so it needs to be carefully planned and focused to be effective" (New Zealand Public Service Commission. 2008). Approaches to coordination can be top-down or bottom-up, formal or informal. Coordination can be applied in developing and reviewing policies and strategies in a holistic manner; encouraging a wider understanding across departmental silos; or promoting integrated implementation where this is more effective. Peters (1998b: 47-49) extracts a series of lessons regarding top-down and bottom-up approaches to coordination:

- **Mere structural changes cannot induce behaviour alteration**, especially if the existing behaviour is reinforced by other factors in government. Geoffrey Mulgan, reflecting on the UK's experience of 'joined up government' (JUG), notes that: "On their own, interdepartmental committees and task forces have tended to have relatively little effect on behaviour, without substantial investment of time and political capital by the prime minister" (2002: 26).
- There is often **greater willingness to coordinate programmes at the bottom of organisations than at the top**. At head offices, budgetary issues, questions of political power, and worries about influence over policy within the overall system of government tend to be dominant. At the lower echelons of organisations, services to clients tend to be the more dominant concern, and there may be greater willingness to

engage in discussions with 'competitors' about ways to provide those services better.

- **Timing is important**. If coordination questions can be addressed early on in planning of a programme, future misunderstandings and organisational opposition can be minimised. On the other hand, if inter-organisational questions are raised prior to a clear idea of what the policy is about, bureaucratic 'turf-fighting' may become more important than the actual formulation of a policy intervention.
- **Formal methods of coordination may not be as beneficial as more informal**. The usual reaction of governments when faced with the issue of coordination is to rely on formal organisational mechanisms to "solve" the problem. Central agencies typically assume their intervention is crucial to successful coordination. However, a better approach may be to permit those involved to address the problems themselves.

2.3 The analytical framework derives in particular from New Zealand, and analyses coordination in terms of mandates, systems and processes, and behaviours.

2.4 The international case studies were from the UK, Brazil and Australia. Key lessons emerging from these are:

a) Coordination should take place at the lowest possible level.
b) Departments working in silos appears to be a challenge facing all countries. It is unrealistic to set a goal of eliminating this behaviour - it should be accepted and managed.
c) Coordination structures should focus on a limited number of key priorities to be effective.
d) There are potential tensions between performance management of managers and coordination. Coordination should reflect in individuals' performance indicators and performance contracts, so that it is clear that coordination is part of their work responsibilities
e) Coordination structures need to be adequately resourced and efficiently managed and have the authority and leverage to ensure compliance.

2.5 Theories of change were developed for the coordination structures and are found in the long report.

2.6 The report also builds on an evaluation conducted in 2008 by The Presidency, conducted by the Technical Assistance Unit (TAU) of National Treasury.

3 COORDINATION CASE STUDIES

Four case studies were used to draw out lessons from how they addressed coordination problems. The four included 2 issues which have been problematic (both addressed by clusters), and two more successful and which were dealt with by MinMECs.

4 FINDINGS: HOW WELL ARE THE COORDINATION SYSTEMS WORKING?

4.1 Regarding **mandates** (e.g. structure roles, leadership), there were high levels of agreement by DGs that some roles are clear, appropriate and realistic, but disagreement on others. There is seen to be a blurring of roles between clusters, IFs and MinMECs. There are indications that the structures are not optimally meeting their roles and mandates. Only 54% of DGs felt that participants at clusters were adequately prepared for meetings, only 50% felt that the quality of decisions was good, and only 32% felt there was good accountability for implementing cluster decisions.

4.2 On average only 6% of the time of clusters was spent on unblocking implementation, while 32% of time was spent on reporting. Contradictions between roles have been identified, including for IFs an excessive focus on PoA reporting at the expense of unblocking implementation and strategic policy alignment. There are felt to be too many meetings of the structures, poor timetabling, and meetings are too long.

4.3 In relation to **systems and processes**, only 29% of DGs felt that reports to the clusters were well prepared. In terms of the agendas of meetings, most DGs felt that cluster agendas were well structured (78%), but fewer felt this for MinMECs (62%) and for IFs (71%). In interviews informants suggested that agendas should focus on strategic items and the core roles of the formal coordination structures, and that meeting chairing could be improved. Many of the structure secretariats are not adequately resourced and are staffed by insufficiently senior officials which undermines their effectiveness. Reports are not being submitted or received on time, inappropriate reports are submitted, and there is inadequate follow-up of decisions taken.

Officials are not always sufficiently empowered to resolve coordination issues outside of the formal coordination structures and this contributes to over-burdening the structures with too many issues. Where issue and task-focused technical task teams have been formed to support the formal coordination structures, these have made important contributions to the effective coordination of developing legislation as well as improving service delivery and monitoring (e.g. case studies on Independent Power Producer and Learner and Teacher Support Material). However such structures are not used enough by the main coordination structures.

Insufficient accountability undermines the effectiveness of the coordination structures where ministers do not always hold DGs accountable for submitting reports and implementing decisions taken by the coordination structures i.e. lack of a culture of consequences. Linked to this, performance management systems are not sufficiently refined to incentivise effective participation in the coordination structures and to counter departmentalism and silo tendencies.

4.4 In terms of **behaviour**, the culture of coordination is seen as weak. This reinforces the need for coordination structures to counter or balance this culture. Overall there was only 40% attendance of DGs at technical clusters in 2013. Nevertheless, 87% of DGs surveyed believe that attending cluster meetings is a valuable use of time, (83% for MinMECs and 80% for IFs). This contradiction may reflect the lack of time. The case studies showed that where there is a high level of commitment to participation in coordination structures by ministers and DGs, and that this impacts positively on the quality of reports and decision-making. Key skills and attitudes which undermine the effective functioning of the coordination structures include around problem solving, the insufficient use of negotiation skills and inadequate chairing skills.

5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Number of meetings:

1. The **number of meetings** is placing impossible demands on Ministers and DGs. Some recommendations include The Presidency engaging with Parliament to agree on days on which departments and ministers will not be called to Parliament, and PoA reporting periods being reduced from 4 per annum to 3 per annum. Other possible options include:
    a) Reducing the number of clusters.
    b) Reducing the numbers of departments participating in each cluster.
    c) Dropping Ministerial Clusters and only having Cabinet committees.

2. The Presidency should do a feasibility study on the use of **video conferencing** (as happens for clusters between Cape Town and Pretoria) and telepresencing technology as a strategy to reduce the direct and indirect costs of such meetings.

5.2 **Weak secretariat functions:**

3. Secretariats need to have the **capacity** to ensure that the reports are higher quality (including PoA reports), much less time is spent on reporting and more time is available for unblocking and decision-making.
4. The structure secretariat role should not be seen as administrative but a **high level organisational role** requiring at least one dedicated senior official. The job descriptions should be revised to reflect this role. Secretariats need to play the following roles:
   a) Organise DG-ministerial briefings in advance of meetings.
   b) Structure meeting agendas to focus on a limited number of strategic issues which are aligned with the core mandates of the structures.
   c) Ensure that reports meet sufficient quality requirements before they are tabled (giving feedback on report quality issues which must first be addressed before being tabled).
   d) Follow up with departments to obtain report submissions on time.
   e) Take good quality minutes.
   f) Follow-up to try and resolve issues between meetings as well as follow-up on the status of decisions made in meetings.
5. Refined **ToRs** should be developed by the Presidency for all structures which clarify the difference in roles, the core mandates they should focus on, as well as operational mechanisms. The ToRs should include clear time-frames which secretariats must strictly enforce for the submission of reports for coordination structure meetings, as well as ensuring that Cabinet committee reports have first been approved for submission to the Cabinet committee via the relevant cluster structure. The revised ToRs should clarify and formalise how feedback should take place between structures.
6. The **Presidency** needs to ensure that required processes have been followed in making Cabinet submissions, that submissions are of sufficient quality, and to advise the principals in The Presidency on the consistency of such submissions with broad government objectives and with other policies and programmes. Secretariats should enforce co-ordination imperatives, among others by having the power to send back submissions into the Cabinet system if they do not meet requirements as well as monitoring and following-up more strongly on implementation of decisions.
7. The Presidency should play a major role in strengthening structure secretariats, with a senior official allocated to each cluster who works with the cluster. Tasks include:
   a) Establishing guidelines for strengthening the resourcing and functioning of structure secretariats.
   b) Working with the secretariats to refine the strategic and unblocking focus of agendas.
   c) Training and monitoring and supporting the secretariats.

5.3 **Lack of leadership, problem-solving, accountability and weak coordination culture:**

8. For coordination to be effective ministers have to take a lead, as demonstrated in the Learning and Teaching Support Materials case study.
9. The **chairing** of meetings needs to be improved, which is closely linked to meeting management, discussed below. **Chairpersonship** should reflect the actual co-ordination role of the ministry/Department in that area (e.g. Rural Development should not coordinate the Economic Cluster but rather one of the lead departments, dti, EDD or National Treasury).

10. **Coordination between coordinating structures** is important for ensuring policy coherence across government. The Presidency should identify issues requiring coordination between structures and set up and lead issue-specific task teams to deal with such issues.
11. There is a need for all departments to ensure that performance agreements for ministers, DGs to at least chief director levels include **stronger performance indicators and targets** for coordinated outputs**/**outcomes and problem-solving, and that these are linked (e.g. between Minister and DG). The Presidency should develop guidelines, and/or specific examples of refined Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) which promote coordination and the effective functioning of the coordination structures. Attendance by ministers at ministerial cluster meetings should be a KPI in the ministers' performance agreements with the President. DGs need to give delegated powers to officials to address coordination issues outside of cluster structures. Issues should only be brought to the high-level structures if attempts outside of the structures have been ineffective.
12. Ministers need to hold DGs accountable when departments do not report on progress to the coordination structures or Cabinet. The Presidency should engage the SA School of Government (as well as explore possible partnerships with Higher Education Institutions) to include in the curriculum:
    a) Coordination and problem-solving skills.
    b) Specialised courses on negotiation skills and meeting chairing, including a high level programme on chairing skills for DGs and ministers.
    c) A dedicated training programme for structure secretariats.

13. The Presidency needs to take responsibility for forming and supporting ad-hoc dedicated coordination task teams to deal with difficult cross-cutting policy or strategy issues where deep differences exist between departments. To enhance their effectiveness, these task teams should report either directly to the President (or deputy President), and/or a senior minister, and/or Cabinet committee.

5.4 Recommendations for **specific structures** are:

14. The refining of MinMEC TORs should clarify which issues require **coordination** between MinMECs and clusters.
15. The Presidency needs to work with MinMECs to clarify the role they play in alignment of strategic plans; priorities, objectives and strategies across the three spheres.
16. It may be appropriate to establish an **economic development MinMEC**, so that the lead economic departments have a forum for working with provinces.
17. DPME to review the TORs with the IFs to ensure members are clear on the IFs' role in unblocking bottlenecks, including guidance for the functioning of special working groups to address specific bottlenecks, and for the referral of matters to clusters.
18. Specific decisions need to be taken regarding the **Presidential Infrastructure Coordinating Committee (PICC)** structures and the outcome 6 technical and ministerial IF. For example, should the Outcome 6 Technical IF support the PICC Management Committee, and is the Outcome 6 Ministerial Forum needed in addition to the PICC Management Committee?.

1. Introduction

1.1 Background to the evaluation

The Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) in the Presidency is the custodian of the National Evaluation System and seeks to ensure continuous improvement in service delivery through performance monitoring and evaluation. DPME's mandate derives from Section 85 (2) (c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, which states that the President exercises executive authority, together with the other members of the Cabinet, by coordinating the functions of state departments and administrations.

The Presidency commissioned an evaluation of the effectiveness of the cluster, implementation forum (IF) and MinMEC coordination structures as part of the National Evaluation Plan for 2013/14.

In 2008, The Presidency produced an assessment of the cluster system, which identified certain issues related to improving oversight of the implementation of the PoA, as well as aligning departments to cross-cutting priorities (see section 2.2 for more details) (Presidency, 2008). In 2010, government introduced the Outcomes System (Presidency, 2010) which included performance agreements for The Presidency and ministers, DAs for the 12 outcomes, and IFs to oversee these. In addition, the Inter-Governmental Relations Act of 2005 (IGRA) formalised the MinMEC arrangements to promote inter-governmental or vertical coordination. The report concluded that further research was needed on why some cluster sub-structures have been more successful at coordination than others and the role of the Presidency as the centre of the cluster system. This evaluation will contribute towards taking forward the above-mentioned areas and confirm whether the findings of the 2008 report are still relevant or not.

Given that the clusters, IFs, and MinMECs have been in existence for a number of years and that the current 2009-2014 term of office is coming to an end, The Presidency decided that this was an opportune time to evaluate the effectiveness of these coordination systems.

1.2 Evaluation purpose and scope

The purpose of the evaluation was to assess the performance of coordination systems in government, both technical and ministerial, and to see how to strengthen their effectiveness.

The focus was on national-level technical and ministerial clusters, MinMECs and IFs, not other coordination systems. The focus included the relationships between the administrative structures (referred to as technical clusters, IFs and MinTECHs) and political structures (referred to as ministerial clusters, MinMECs, and ministerial IFs) including the linkages between these and the Cabinet committees.

The original evaluation questions as contained in the evaluation's terms of reference are as follows:

1. **To what extent are these systems improving coordination in government in general?**
   a) What is working well and what is not working well, and why?
   b) How are the cluster system (ministerial and Forum of South African Director General clusters) and MinMECs working in general terms? How do the ministerial and technical structures relate? How do they work in relation to the outcome IFs? Is there a need for

rationalisation in this regard?

2. **What needs to be done to improve the coordination mechanisms?** For example:
   a) Are the mandates, roles and responsibilities clear, appropriate and being fulfilled or do they need to be clarified or changed?
   b) Does there need to be change in mandates?
   c) Do the coordination structures have the institutional capacity to do what is expected of them? If not, what should be done in this regard? How could their operation be improved?
   d) Is the schedule of meetings appropriate?
   e) What is needed to ensure appropriate representation?

3. **Should the regulatory framework be changed,** e. g. to give clusters or MinMECs authority and accountability for overseeing implementation?

1.3 Report structure

This report has the following six main sections as follows:

a) Section 1: Introduction - evaluation background, purpose, and methodology.

b) Section 2: Coordination background including the three coordination structures; key coordination concepts; the coordination analytic framework, and a summary of overall coordination lessons from the international case studies.

c) Section 3: Coordination issue case studies to identify key lessons in terms of how the coordination structures have handled specific coordination issues.

d) Section 4: Overall findings and conclusions regarding how well the three coordination structures/ systems are working in terms of mandate, resource/ process, and behaviour issues.

e) Section 5: Cluster, MinMEC and IF-specific findings and conclusions regarding how well each of the three coordination structures/ systems are working in terms of mandate, resource/ process, and behaviour issues.

f) Section 6: Overall conclusions and recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the coordination mechanisms.

g) The annexes include a summary of the case studies.

1.4 Methodology

This section summarises the methodology and more detail can be found in Annex 3. An analytic framework was derived from the international literature review and identified enablers and success factors for coordination. This was used to guide the collection and analysis of data relevant to the functioning of cluster, IF and MinMEC structures.

A rich set of qualitative and quantitative data was collected from a variety of data sources to inform the findings, conclusions and recommendations. This included **key informant interviews** (between June 2013-September 2013) with four ministers (Health, National Planning Commission, Tourism, and Home Affairs - interviews were requested with nine ministers overall), sixteen

directors general, ten outcome facilitators, and eight other senior officials; **a survey of DGs** carried out in August 2013 at a FOSAD workshop (34 out of 45 DGs (75%) responded); **analysis of selected minutes** of cluster, IF, and MinMEC structures (June 2011- August 2013); **analysis of cluster DG attendance** levels (2012-2013); **four coordination issue case studies** dealt with by the coordination structures (both dealt with well and dealt with poorly); and **a review of other key documents** and legislation on the functioning of the coordination structures, including the 2008 Presidency review of the cluster system, the Inter-governmental Relations Act 13 of 2005 and the DPME's terms of reference for implementation forums (March 2012). Evaluation limitations and process challenges experience are detailed in Annex 3: Methodology.

A steering committee was chaired by The Presidency and included four director generals. This oversaw the evaluation process and commented on draft deliverables at key stages. The Steering Committee met on 13 March, 27 June, and 19th August 2013 and a presentation the preliminary findings were made at a FOSAD Management Committee on 7 October 2013. A number of local and international peer reviewers also provided comments on the draft report, including Joel Netshitenzhe, Geoff Mulgan, Anne Letsebe. The final report was approved by a Steering Committee on 30 January 2014.

2. Background and Context

Section 2 provides an overview of the cluster, IF, and MinMEC system. It then discusses key coordination definitions, concepts, approaches and tools, and high level lessons from the literature.

2.1 The cluster, IF, and MinMEC system

2.1.1 Cluster system

FOSAD clusters are responsible for policy and legislative issues, as well as other horizontal cross-cutting matters. They comprise technical clusters (at DG level) and ministerial clusters (at ministerial level) which then submit reports to Cabinet committees for decision.

The aim of the Cabinet cluster system was to ensure that ministers have sufficient time outside the Cabinet committees to deal with cross-cutting policy issues. Clusters do not have a statutory mandate. However, during the period 1999-2009, the Presidency produced various documents which clarify the purpose and roles of clusters (Presidency, 2001, 2008, 2009). The four main cluster roles are to (Presidency, 2008):

a) Improve Cabinet decision-making processes;

b) Harmonise and align the work (including policies and priorities) of departments and reduce departmentalism (coordinate cross-cutting matters, legislation and policy);

c) Produce cluster-based reports on the implementation of the PoA;

d) Coordination or oversight over implementation of the PoA.

2.1.2 Implementation Forums

In 2009 government decided to introduce an outcomes approach, focusing on the achievement of results in 12 priority areas (outcomes). When the President entered into performance agreements with his ministers in 2010, he appointed some of them as coordinating ministers for each of the outcomes. In April 2010, Cabinet approved a memorandum clarifying the institutional arrangements for the outcomes approach. Key decisions included the following (Governance & Administration Cluster Draft TORs, January 2013):

a) Outcome coordinating ministers will lead IFs to coordinate the development and implementation of delivery agreements (DAs) for each of the outcomes.
b) As far as possible, existing structures will be used as outcome IFs. Outcomes were therefore allocated to various ministerial clusters and MinMECs (and other structures similar to MinMECs) (see Table 1). For example, the implementation forum for Outcome 12 was identified as the G&A Ministerial Cluster and the Implementation Forum for Outcome nine was identified as the local government MinMEC.
c) There will be flexibility and diversity in the membership and functioning of the IFs and technical implementation forums. Some of the work of the forums may be carried out by various types of substructures. All departments and other spheres which have a substantial contribution to make to an outcome should participate in the forums or their substructures.

d) The IFs will provide progress reports on the outcomes to the relevant Cabinet committees on a quarterly basis.
e) The new PoA will be based on the outputs, indicators and targets for the outcomes.
f) DPME will assist the technical IFs with monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the delivery agreements for each outcome.

Table 1: Relationship between implementation forums, clusters and MinMECs

	Coordinating Structure	Technical Implementation Forum	FOSAD Cluster	Implementation Forum	Cabinet Committee
	Level	Administrative	Administrative	Executive and administrative	Executive
	Agenda	Agenda: implementation of outcome	Agenda: General coordination	Agenda: implementation of outcomes	As before, with addition of outcome reports
1	Education	Headcom	Human Development	MinMec	Social Protection and HD
2	Health	Headcom	Human Development	MinMec	Social Protection and HD
3	Security	JCPS Cluster / substructure	JCPS	JCPS	JCPS
4	Skills	Headcom	Human Development	MinMec	Social / economic
5	Employment	Economic Cluster / substructure	Economic	Economic	Economic Sectors and Infrastructure Development
6	Infrastructure	Infrastructure Cluster / substructure	Infrastructure	Infrastructure	Economic Sectors and Infrastructure Development
7	Rural	Headcom	Social Protection / Economic	Expanded MinMEC	Social / economic
8	H. Settlements	Headcom	Social Protection	Expanded MinMEC	Social Protection and HD
9	Local gov't	Headcom	G&A	Expanded MinMEC	G&A
10	Environment	Headcom	Economic / Infrastructure	Expanded MinMEC	Economic Sectors and Infrastructure Development
11	International	ICTS Cluster / substructure	ICTS	ICTS	ICTS
12	Public service	G&A Cluster / substructure	G&A	G&A	G&A
	Key:				
	Integration with MinMEC system				
	Continuity with existing cluster system				

Source: Presidency. 27 May 2010. Guide to the Outcomes Approach.

In summary outcome implementation forums are responsible for producing the 12 delivery agreements, coordinating implementation, and monitoring and reporting on progress against implementation of the delivery agreement. The purpose of DAs is to provide the clusters and MinMECs with a plan for implementing government's strategic agenda.

With respect to the relationship between clusters, IFs, and MinMECs the Presidency's TORs state the following (and refer to Table 1 illustrating the links between clusters, IFs and MinMECs):

> Implementation Forums are usually either MinMECs or Clusters. At some meetings the MinMEC or Cluster will focus on the outcome, and sometimes it will focus on other issues. When the MinMEC or Cluster is focusing on the outcome it is then functioning as an Implementation Forum. The Technical MinMEC or Cluster we refer to as the Technical Implementation Forum, and the meeting of ministers and MECs as the Minister's Implementation Forum.

2.1.3 MinMECs

MinMECs (and MinTECHs at DG level) are sectorally-based meetings of national ministers and provincial members of executive committees (MECs) applied for concurrent functions. The primary reason for their establishment is to promote cooperation, coordination and communication between the various national departments and their provincial counterparts. MinMECs comprise a national

minister and members of the executive council (MECs) in each of the provinces. Depending on the sector, MinMECs are intended to meet regularly, and discuss the implementation of government policies and the division of financial and other resources. The forum allows for cross-cutting issues to be debated and the opportunity for various departments involved in the delivery of a common objective to collaborate, and more importantly, to coordinate their efforts in the interests of efficiency of effort and expediting delivery. Their deliberations are less overarching and more sectoral and detailed in character than the matters discussed by bodies such as the Cabinet or the inter-governmental forums.

MinMECs are the only one of the three structures that has a mandate defined through legislation (the IGR Act 13 of 2005) as follows:

> A consultative forum for the Cabinet member responsible for the functional area for which the forum is established (to):
>
> 1. Raise matters of national interest within that functional area with provincial governments, and if appropriate, organised local government and to hear their views on those matters.
> 2. Consult provincial governments and, if appropriate, organised local government on:
>   a) The development of national policy and legislation relating to matters affecting that functional area.
>   b) The implementation of national policy and legislation with respect to that functional area.
>   c) The coordination and alignment within that functional area of:
>   - Strategic performance plans.
>   - Priorities, objectives and strategies across national, provincial and local governments.
>   - Any other matters of strategic importance within that functional area that affect the interests of other governments.
> 3. Discuss the performance in the provision of services in order to detect failures and to initiate preventive or corrective action when necessary.

MinMECs and MinTECHs are therefore are responsible for the following:

- The harmonisation of legislation within a given sector.
- The division and deployment of financial resources.
- The harmonisation of programmes on a national basis.
- Consultation and negotiation on national norms and standards.
- The integration of inter-governmental policies and strategy.
- The formulation of joint programmes and projects.
- The sharing of sectoral information.
- The unambiguous assignment of roles and responsibilities between the various spheres of government.

2.2 Key coordination concepts: definitions, reasons to coordinate, approaches and tools

2.2.1 Definitions of coordination

There are a number of definitions of coordination:

a) "A process in which two or more parties take one another into account for the purpose of bringing together their decisions and/or activities into harmonious or reciprocal relation" (Kernaghan and Siegel, 1987: 263).

b) "The development of ideas about joint and holistic working, joint information systems, dialogue between agencies, process of planning and making decisions" Perri. 2004:106).

c) The all-important duty of inter-relating the various parts of the work (Gunlick. 1937).

d) '"The instruments and mechanisms that aim to enhance the voluntary or forced alignment of tasks and efforts within the public sector. These mechanisms are used in order to create a greater coherence and to reduce redundancy, lacunae and contradictions within policies, implementation or management" (Bouckaert et al. 2010).

e) The sharing of information, resources and responsibilities to achieve a particular outcome (New Zealand State Services Commission, Factors for Successful Coordination. 2008).

Coordination can be seen as a continuum from networking (exchange of information), coordination (shared work), cooperation (shared resources) to collaboration collaboration (shared responsibility, risks and rewards). The continuum demonstrates that not all interdepartmental and inter-sphere coordinating interrelationships involve formal coordinating arrangements. The extent to which goals, power, resources, risks, successes and accountabilities are shared across the continuum varies. Coordinating government approaches require collaborative relationships as depicted at the further end of the continuum where common goals, recognised interdependencies, high levels of commitment, and shared responsibilities and rewards are established.

2.2.2 Why is coordination important?

Reasons include the following:

a) The challenges facing countries and people are usually bigger than one department/agency/sector of society can solve alone.
b) By pooling the best of their resources rather than working in isolation departments/agencies/role-players can provide better solutions, reducing duplication.
c) Citizens (and businesses) see one government, not the silos that government works in.

Coordination is seen to be necessary when "an outcome can only be improved or attained through coordinated government action, and when the benefits…outweigh the costs…. But coordination takes time, resources and energy, so it needs to be carefully planned and focused to be effective" (New Zealand Public Service Commission. 2008). Often one of the reasons for the gap between government's stated intentions and the reality of government services experienced by citizens is due to poor coordination (Gregory, 2006).

However coordination is a challenge experienced by all governments, not just South Africa, to which there are no easy or quick solutions.

2.2.3 Coordination approaches and mechanisms/tools

Top-down vs bottom-up approaches

Top-down approaches are often linked to the policy/legislative or programme/project

development stage, whist bottom-up approaches are often linked to the policy/legislative or programme/project implementation stage.

Coordination can also be implemented from the **bottom-up**. This bottom-up perspective on coordination and implementation uses the experience and knowledge of lower-level employees who are in direct contact with clients.

Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011:99) point out that coordination can also be achieved less formally, by voluntary cooperation with a network. This can be more easily achieved where objectives are widely shared amongst all network members, communications are easy and full and the scale of operation is modest in that no major administrative reorganisation is required. Informal coordination can then happen spontaneously as needed.

A third form of coordination is the **market mechanism** which enables the activities of many producers/sellers and consumer/buyers to be coordinated without the instructions of the central authority. For example, the price mechanism enables the activities of many producers/sellers to be coordinated without any central authority telling them to do so. The use of contracting in the public sector can be considered a central element of market-type coordination. The problem is that the market mechanism may be effective in coordinating the buyers and sellers of a defined product, but less effective at coordinating sick people and health care.

Peters (1998b: 47-49) extracts a series of lessons regarding top-down and bottom-up approaches to coordination:

- **Mere structural changes cannot induce behaviour alteration**, especially if the existing behaviour is reinforced by other factors in government. Geoffrey Mulgan, reflecting on the UK's experienced of 'joined up government' (JUG), notes that: "On their own, interdepartmental committees and task forces have tended to have relatively little effect on behaviour, without substantial investment of time and political capital by the prime minister" (2002: 26).
- There is often **greater willingness to coordinate programmes at the bottom of organisations than at the top**. At head offices, budgetary issues, questions of political power, and worries about influence over policy within the overall system of government tend to be dominant. At the lower echelons of organisations, services to clients tend to be the more dominant concern, and there may be greater willingness to engage in discussions with 'competitors' about ways to provide those services better.
- **Timing is important**. If coordination questions can be addressed early on in the formulation of a programme, future misunderstandings and organisational opposition can be minimised, if not necessarily eliminated. On the other hand, if the inter-organisational questions are raised prior to the existence of a clear idea of what the policy is about, the bureaucratic 'turf-fighting' may become more important than the actual formulation of a policy intervention.
- **Formal methods of coordination may not be as beneficial as the more informal techniques involving bargaining and creating market-time conditions**, if not real markets (see below). The usual reaction of governments when faced with the issue of coordination or similar challenges is to rely on hierarchy and formal organisational mechanisms to" solve" the problem. Central agencies are particularly prone to assume that their intervention is absolutely crucial to successful coordination. However, as with coordination at the bottom of the pyramids discussed above, a better approach may be to permit those involved to address the problems themselves.

Using coordination when

Coordination can take place at various **stages**: during the planning and budgeting process, the policy/legislative or programme/project development stage, and/or the policy/legislative or programme/project implementation stage. The range of coordination instruments or mechanisms that various countries have developed as responses to their needs include tools for (Mulgan, 2002; Australian Public Service, 2004):

- **Developing and reviewing policies and strategies in a holistic manner** (e.g. policy-making units located in the centre of government, Cabinet Implementation Units (CIUs); regular cross-cutting reviews of policy; joint task teams/forces reporting directly to the president or minister; joined up budgets;
- Encouraging a **wider understanding across silos** (e.g. improving government's focus on outcomes, new approaches to professional development; appointment of ministers with cross-cutting portfolios; inter-departmental committees to produce or review policy; professional networks); and
- **Promoting integrated implementation where more effective** (e.g. coordination of purchasing; re-shaping business processes that cut across departments).

Mechanisms which facilitate coordination **Figure 1** below identifies three categories of mechanisms which facilitate coordination. 'Behind the Handshake' refers to the need for a **favourable organisational culture** to facilitate coordinated approaches in planning and executing programs and policies. Without this context, the use of coordination mechanisms is unlikely to lead to success. The 'Visible Hand' emphasises the need for **strong leadership** for successful coordination. The 'Invisible Hand' emphasises the need for an appropriate level of **resources and incentives**. Coordination initiatives may, for example, benefit from a management culture that relies less on command and control, and more on financial incentives, continual monitoring, and on-going consultation and engagement.

Figure 1**: Three categories of coordination mechanism**



Source: Adapted from Mansholt (2008) by Public Health Agency of Canada (accessed at: http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/publicat/2009/ActNowBC/section2-partie2-eng.php#bib).

2.3 Analytical framework

An analytical framework has been developed drawing from the literature, the TORs for this evaluation assignment, the 2008 evaluation of the clusters (Presidency. 2008), and the factors described in 2.2.3. The diagram in**Error! Reference source not found.** below depicts the three dimensions of success factors/enablers: mandates, systems and processes and behaviours, building on the New Zealand model (Source: New Zealand Government, State Commission Services, February 2008).

Figure 2: Factors and enablers of successful coordination



Source: Impact Economics (2013)

Mandate: for successful coordination, leaders must commit to making coordination work by prioritising the coordinated activity within an all-of-government context. Ministers and other stakeholders also need to buy into the coordinated approach and public servants must agree on clearly-defined joint outcomes to focus effort. The roles of each coordination structure must be appropriate and documented, either through legislation or less formally (e.g. TORs, memorandum of understandings etc.).

Systems: for successful coordination, appropriate governance and accountability frameworks must be in place and sufficient and appropriate resources and meeting management systems must be in place to support effective decision-making, as well as the monitoring of decision-making and

enforcing accountability for implementation of decisions. Processes should support coordinated planning of policy and programmes.

Behaviours: for successful coordination, the right departments/spheres/role-players must be involved at the appropriate level/stage with the appropriate authority, and the right skills and competencies to work collaboratively to take decisions which support coordination. Both departmental organisational culture, as well as cultures developed within specific coordination structures, must support coordination so that, over time, those civil servants involved in the coordinated activity come to share a common culture, and shared priorities, terminology, and values.

Annex 4 contains greater detail on coordination success factors and enablers.

This analytical framework has been used to inform the analysis of international coordination case studies, as well as the evaluation of the coordination structures/systems.

2.4 Lessons from the international case studies for South Africa

South Africa is not unique. Even developed countries struggle to improve coordination. A 2004 Australian Public Service (APS) report notes that (APS, 2004):

> Often the real challenge of whole-of-government work is not the large-scale, high-level, multi-lateral exercise so much as the day-to-day realities of trying to work across boundaries to make sure that outcomes are achieved.

Given that there are such a wide range of potential barriers to coordination, a major implication is that coordination initiatives should only be undertaken only when there is a clear justification and on a selective and pragmatic basis.

This section summarises the lessons identified in the separate report commissioned as part of this evaluation on international case studies from the UK, Brazil, and Australia, using the analytical framework. The lessons and preliminary conclusions are identified below in terms of the framework of mandates, systems/processes, and behaviours (the long evaluation report has more detail).

Mandates: roles/responsibilities, legislative/alternative

a. Governments usually rely on formal organisational mechanisms to "solve" coordination or similar challenges. Mere structural changes cannot induce behaviour alteration, especially if the existing behaviour is reinforced by other factors in government. A better approach may be to permit those involved to address the problems themselves, and the incentives systems need to be reviewed.
b. There should not be a one-size-fits-all approach for coordination structures. The nature and design of the structure should be informed by its purpose and the tasks it has to perform.
c. If coordination structures do not have a legislated mandate, they are easier to abolish (for example, if there is a change in political power).

Mandates: leadership

a. Without the right kind of leadership and support, it is difficult for structures to influence behaviours which support coordination. Active support of the Prime Minister/President is needed for cross-cutting policies and strategies. Political commitment is also needed for high-level negotiation to unblock coordination challenges. Ministers need to be champions of

cross-cutting coordination measures.

b. Structure can facilitate coordination, but to produce behavioural changes requires the active intervention of political leaders at the top of government. The weight attached to coordination by politicians appears to count for more than structure.

Mandates: clear vision

a. The more focused the coordination structures are, the higher their chances of success.
b. Better coordinated policy and programme development processes can reduce coordination challenges and problems during implementation.

Systems/processes: accountability/performance mechanisms including monitoring and evaluation

a. Timing matters - if coordination issues can be addressed early in the planning of a programme, future misunderstandings can be minimised. This may mean formal agreements. On the other hand, if inter-organisational questions are raised before there is a clear idea of what the policy is about, bureaucratic 'turf-fighting' may become more important than the actual formulation of a policy intervention.
b. Cross-cutting work should be in Ministers' performance contracts with the President.
c. There needs to be clear responsibility for implementing decisions, and consequences for failure to implement these.
d. Cross-cutting activity should be visibly rewarded and leaders should be judged and rewarded on their performance in securing cross-cutting objectives as highly as achieving purely departmental objectives.

Systems/processes: meeting management/sufficient resources

a. There is a need to ensure that there are clear principles and guidelines which inform the role of secretariats in supporting the effective functioning of coordination structures.
b. There is a need to ensure sufficient secretariat skills and capacity to ensure that the agendas of coordination structures are strategic and focused on issues which are appropriate to address at that level given the nature of participants in the coordination structure.
c. There is a need for awareness of cost-effectiveness with respect to the frequency of meetings held by coordination structures.
d. The centre of government can play an important administrative support role for the establishment and functioning of temporary coordination structures which are established to deal with specific time-bound tasks.

Behaviours: organisational culture, shared values, relationships of trust

a. Departments working in silos appear to be a universal norm which most people are comfortable with and which it is very difficult to break away from.
b. Leadership has a vital role in sustaining a culture that promotes and supports a sense of individual responsibility on the part of staff.
c. Incentive mechanisms should complement or reinforce the operations of coordination structures wherever possible.
d. A culture of negotiation, or preparedness to negotiate, can be important to address coordination issues outside of formal coordination structure meetings. This negotiation can take place at various levels, from the ministerial level down.

Behaviours: skills, competencies, participation, representation

a. To deliver joined-up government, managers and staff need a broader skill set than the traditional technical skills set of policy development and programme management (Allen, 2006). Appropriate leadership styles and skills are most important in developing a culture that supports joining up collaboration and delivers on successful outcomes. Managers need to be willing to take risks, tolerate ambiguity, act as mediators and build trust (Jackson & Stainsby, 2000).
b. The public service's HR and recruitment processes need to include the competencies and experience on the part of officials to engage in and support the kinds of behaviours which are necessary for successful coordination (e.g. negotiation, team-work, problem-solving etc.).

2.5 Theories of change for the South African cluster system/MinMECs/IFs

Theories of change (ToC) were developed to identify the assumptions about how these structures are intended to work, to be tested in the evaluation. The long evaluation report contains these.

2.6 The findings of the 2008 Presidency report on clusters

In 2008, The Presidency conducted a review of the cluster system (Presidency. 2008). The main findings of the Presidency's 2008 review included the following:

1. **There was poor participation in cluster meetings** from DGs and their deputies for two reasons; they did not see sufficient value in attending the meetings, and insufficient focus on policy and strategy.
2. **Configuration of clusters:** Clusters should consist of the key departments which are core to the issues around which the cluster is formed. The Presidency needs to develop a TOR for each cluster, clarifying the scope of issues to be dealt with by each cluster, as well as the roles and responsibilities of clusters in relation to other institutional IGRA mechanisms.
3. **Role and mandate of the clusters and role of the PoA:** Clusters were not fulfilling their oversight role regarding implementation of the PoA, in part because the decentralised regulatory framework does not necessarily make provision for clusters to play such a role (i.e. a cluster structure cannot take decisions which have financial impacts on a particular department and which impinge on the responsibilities of accounting officers under the Public Finance Management Act). The PoA should reflect the key priorities that cut across the three spheres of government, as well as those that cut across national departments. The PoA should contain a balanced and holistic set of key cross-cutting priorities.

The report concluded that further research was needed on why some cluster sub-structures have been more successful at coordination than others, and the role of the Presidency as the centre of the cluster system. This evaluation aimed to contribute towards taking forward the above-mentioned areas requiring further research and to confirm whether some of the findings of the 2008 report are still relevant or not.

3. Coordination Case Studies

Four case studies of actual events or process were used to draw out lessons of the effectiveness, successes and shortcomings of selected structures (see Table 2 below). They examined the reasons why the structure is effective or not and whether the structures are fulfilling their roles appropriately. The four case studies are as follows (Annex 5 has a short overview of each):

- Regulation of independent power producers (IPPs)
- Textbook challenges, set up well functioning monitoring system (HeadCom, Council of Education Ministers).
- Accreditation of the Metro's with the Housing Function: Complex vertical transfer/assignment of the function to six metro's negotiated through a horizontal arrangement of the four affected provinces and their metro representatives.
- Finalisation of EIA process.

Table 2: Key success factors and challenges in the case studies

Case study	Key success factors	Key challenges
Regulation of IPPs	• Committed leadership by minister to drive legislation. • ISMO bill clearly stated as a priority deliverable in Outcome 6 Delivery Agreement - reinforced urgency and made accountability clear. • Effective monitoring and reporting on progress with legislation incl. Cabinet.	• Stakeholder management to address potential conflicts between government objectives (e.g. affordable electricity) and para-statal objectives (e.g. sustainable finances) requires dedicated processes/ structures..
Textbook challenges	• Political ownership of the issue by Minister and MECs with hands-on directives and clear priorities. • Strong coordination mechanisms at provincial level enhanced MinMEC effectiveness and ability to monitor Provincial service delivery. • Adoption of a sector plan which is specific about coordination mechanisms and mandates. • Careful management of concurrent powers and Provincial willingness to partner with national department around support efforts.	• National departments need to acknowledge their roles should extend beyond that of policy formulation, and include provision of capacity and support to provincial departments to implement policy. • Sometimes, different national and provincial views exist as to whether MinMECs should be used as a mechanism to take decisions, or only to consult, on national policy or legislation.. Legally, MinMECs only have decision-making powers if a specific act has granted such powers.
Accreditation of the Metros with the Housing Function	• Underlying policy intentions were clear and widely supported by all 3 spheres. • Realisation by all 3 spheres that housing function best performed at local sphere closest to beneficiaries addressing localised needs and conditions.	• MinMECs are limited in ability to deal with horizontal aspects of concurrent powers which can result in fragmentation of policy, planning and implementation. • Not clear if MinMECs are able to effectively broaden participation beyond core national department, and provincial delivery departments to address vertical inter-governmental as well as horizontal, issues by involving local government and other relevant national and provincial departments.
Finalisation of EIA	• MinMEC playing a role to enhance awareness and communication of EIA	• Committee provided for environmental coordination in NEMA is defunct and

Case study	Key success factors	Key challenges
process	regulations and procedures.	National Environmental Advisory Forum has been disbanded- no national. mechanism for civil society to get involved in environmental issues. • Poor coordination between law reform initiatives resulting in duplicated procedures and processes. • Greater recognition of concurrent nature of environmental management required to ensure meaningful deliberations on law reform. • Proposed centralisation of environmental decision-making in MPRDA and draft Infrastructure Bill may be inappropriate.

The following conclusions emerged from these case studies, which reinforce lessons from the international case studies.

1. **Effective leadership by ministers within coordination structure meetings** is important at both political and administrative levels.
2. **Meeting management:** Importance of effective management and chairing of meetings, the preparation of supporting documentation. Agendas are dominated by issues which could be dealt with more effectively by technical committees.
3. **Resolving certain coordination issues outside of cluster/MinMEC meetings** can be critical to support their effective mandate fulfilment..
4. The importance of **bringing in external stakeholders**, e.g. through public hearings, where there are stakeholders outside government with strong interests in the matter and/or potential conflicting objectives which require creative solutions.

4. Findings: How well are the coordination systems working overall?

Sections 4 and 5 draw together the findings from the survey of 34 DGs, the face-to-face interviews with 38 DGs, ministers, and outcome facilitators/managers, the case studies, and the analysis of data on minuted decisions taken by the three structures between June 2011 – June 2013, as well as attendance levels for the selected coordination structures (where available). Section 4 is organised into three main sections as per the analytic framework (mandates, systems and processes, and behaviours) with sub-sections that relate to the evaluation questions and sub-themes. Detailed findings about individual structures are found in the long report, but some specific recommendations are retained in this 1/5/25 report.

4.1 Mandates

4.1.1 Clear mandates captured in legislative/policy framework or other means

There are high levels of agreement on the clarity and appropriateness of certain structure roles (where 85+% of DGs agree) but high levels of disagreement on others (20-50% of DGs disagree). There is therefore a need to clarify and confirm the roles of some structures. There may also be issues of role overlap between the structures which need to be addressed.

When key informants were asked to comment as to whether there was a need to define a mandate for IFs or clusters in legislation, there was widespread consensus that this was not necessary and would be undesirable. However there was a feeling that cluster mandates needed to be more formal (e.g. through formalised TORs).

4.1.2 Are there any contradictions between existing mandates/roles and responsibilities and any other structures or legislation?

There is some lack of clarity on the relative mandates of ministerial clusters and Cabinet committees, with confusion at times as to whether decisions to unblock delivery should be taken by the ministerial structure or Cabinet committee. In some cases reports bypass ministerial structures and are submitted directly to Cabinet committees. A number of key informants believe that it is not necessary to have three levels of structures (technical cluster, ministerial cluster, and Cabinet committee) and that there is some overlap between the technical and ministerial cluster structures.

A small number of key informants believe that there is no need for cluster structures at all (and that issue-focused IMCs are a better mechanism and can be established by the Presidency should the need arise). A concern was also raised that decisions taken by ministers at an IMC can get overturned by officials at a technical cluster and that IMC decisions should go directly to the Cabinet committee and not to the clusters.

The feeling was expressed that we are ‘meeting for the sake of meeting’ and that there is a conflict between the large number of meetings that have to be attended, including parliamentary portfolio committees.

4.1.3 Are the systems meeting their existing roles/mandates, including decision-making?

There are a number of indications that the structures are not optimally meeting their roles and mandates, including inadequate preparation before meetings, sometimes due to insufficient time between meetings or reports not being received seven days before meetings. This impacts on the quality of structure decisions made and uneven implementation of structure decisions, which is linked to poor enforcement of accountability for implementing structure decisions.

Table 3: DG Survey Coordination Structure Decision-Making Effectiveness

Question	Rating (% of DGs surveyed) of		
	Clusters	IFs	MinMECs
% of DGs surveyed who feel that representatives were adequately prepared for meetings in the past year	54%	50%	67%
% of DGs who feel that the quality of decisions made was good in the past year	50%	50%	65%
% of DGs who feel that recommendations were effectively implemented	50%	61%	45%
% of DGs who feel that there is good accountability for implementing cluster decisions	32%	47%	45%



Source: Impact Economix. 2013.

Table 3 shows that around half of DGs felt that those participating were not adequately prepared for meetings, better for MinMECs. Again only half felt that the quality of cluster decisions was good, that they were implemented effectively (better for IFs), and only a third that there was good accountability for implementing cluster decisions (again better for IFs and MinMECs). An interesting point made by one minister was that "…coordination is about pulling everything together and putting all the right pieces in the right places, with a view to moving towards a single outcome. The cluster system is actually more about consolidation than coordination. Coordination actually takes place outside the system." This comment reflects the view that cluster structure meetings spend a lot of time on consolidating PoA reports and that this focus can be at the expense of the cluster's role in taking decisions which actually promote coordination.

An analysis of decisions taken from minutes of meetings between June 2011-June 2013 shows a large proportion of decisions taken (and, by implication, meeting time) dealt with either the structure's administrative functioning (e.g. attendance, agenda) or reporting (49% of cluster decisions, 33% for IF, 39% for MinMEC), rather than unblocking implementation. This points to the coordination structures not working optimally.

Key informants felt strongly that the reporting role on the PoA was becoming a dominant focus at the expense of the strategic role of the structures (especially the clusters). The feeling was expressed that the structures are trying to coordinate too many issues and that there should be a more strategic focus on a smaller number of priority issues requiring coordination. One DG indicated that "with the cluster system working as it has we are seeing an increase in policies that conflict across the clusters… legislation based on such policies resulting in a conflict … and

sometimes resulting in legislation being passed which is not possible to implement." This points to the importance of the role of The Presidency in ensuring coordination across clusters.

In addition, inefficiencies in the PoA reporting process were mentioned by numerous key informants interviewed. These inefficiencies include the use of different reporting format templates for different structures, the need to obtain report approvals from many levels and the need for numerous senior level meetings to discuss PoA reports. These inefficiencies put additional unnecessary pressure on scarce minister and DG time. As a result, there has been an increase in policies which conflict with each other and/or which are not fully implementable (an indication of coordination failure).

In terms of mandates/roles, key informants identified the following tensions:

a) Clusters and IFs have become compliance driven with the danger being that IFs are becoming mainly focused on getting PoA reports to Cabinet, at the expense of focusing on unblocking implementation blockages, as well as at the expense of focusing at a strategic level on policy alignment/disjuncture issues.
b) In some cases IFs are not focusing on the strategic priorities in the DAs.
c) Regarding the role of DGs and ministers, one key informant proposed that there needs to be a clear delineation between DG and minister's roles. Ministers should focus on coordinating policy to ensure that there are no contradictions/inconsistencies and DGs should focus on implementation. However it is not clear if such a delineation is feasible.
d) National policies do not always firstly go through MinMECs before being submitted to Cabinet and that Cabinet decisions are not always communicated back down to MinMECs to enhance coordinated implementation."

4.1.4 High levels of political and administrative commitment to coordination and leadership

Key informants interviewed as well as the literature point to the importance of high levels of commitment of both ministers and DGs to coordination. Both political and administrative leadership are needed and the ability of the political and administrative level to work well together is important for effective coordination.

The case studies illustrated the importance of leadership, e.g. around Learner Support and Teaching Materials (LSTM) where political ownership of coordination mechanisms by the minister in collaboration with MECs was important to improve coordination in MinMECs. It is clear that the personal qualities of ministers and DGs can have a big impact on how effective the coordination structures are.

4.1.5 Supporting Cabinet to make effective decisions

As well as playing a role in specific policy issues, clusters also act as the conduit of issues for discussion in Cabinet. Therefore it is important for clusters to be effective so the right issues are reaching Cabinet, with the right level of evidence, and with clear decisions needed indicated. The key issues identified by key informants which impact on the capacity of Cabinet to take meaningful decisions include the following:

a) Sometimes the information going to Cabinet is too detailed, for example the level of reporting to Cabinet on the PoA is too detailed at the activity level and should rather focus on higher level indicators (outcomes and outputs). Cabinet is not always clear as to whether the role of Cabinet committees should be to focus at a strategic (outcomes level)

or a detailed operational level (sub-outputs). It was also suggested that Cabinet needs to be more hands on and take resolutions per outcome and follow up on these.

b) The quality of reports sent to Cabinet can be poor, which can then negatively impact on the ability of Cabinet to make meaningful decisions. Informants suggested that this results from the following three factors:
    - The quality of DG and ministerial participation in the structures, and their attention to the quality of reports.
    - Poorly attended meetings.
    - Reports to Cabinet committees do not always first go through the coordination structures and therefore do not necessarily benefit from inputs from relevant departments or spheres.

c) Documents sometimes take a long time to reach the Cabinet committees because of frequent cancellation of technical or ministerial meetings and this slows down government's decision-making and consequent implementation.

4.2 Systems and processes

4.2.1 Relationships between political and administrative level

Three key issues have been raised by informants regarding the relationships between political and administrative levels, which impact on the effectiveness of the structures in coordination:

a) The extent to which there is a **relationship of trust and respect between DGs and ministers** is particularly important in the effective operation of departments, and therefore implementation of policy.

b) **The time available between technical and ministerial structure meetings** to allow for briefings between DGs and ministers for adequate preparation in advance of ministerial structure meetings. The survey of DGs shows that only between 50%-67% of DGs believe the coordination structure representatives were adequately prepared for meetings. It was noted that there was not always sufficient time in-between meetings to allow for briefing of ministers in advance of ministerial structure meetings.

c) **The extent to which ministers hold their DGs accountable for both submitting reports to the coordination structures, as well as implementing decisions** made by Cabinet and the coordination structures. The suvey of DGs shows that only between 32%-47% of DGs believe that there is good accountability for implementing decisions taken by the coordination structures.

4.2.2 Sufficient resources to support effective functioning of coordination structures

Meeting schedules

A significant proportion of DGs feel that there are too many meetings (42% of DGs agree/neutral for clusters; 44% for IFs, 10% for MinMECs), and that the meetings are too long (44% of DGs agree/neutral for clusters; 54% for IFs, 43% for MinMECs). One Minister stated that "This additional layer [clusters], added 30 plus meetings to my diary per annum. It is just not possible. It added to the diaries of the DG's 50 plus meetings. And, you know, if you look at some of the bigger departments, it will obviously still be more. So this is a burden that I think right from the outset was impossible for ministers, DG's and other staff to carry and deal with."

Chairing

A significant proportion of DGs felt that meetings are not chaired effectively (Table 4). As one key informant noted: "Who chairs and the nature in which they do it is very important" (DG).

Secretariat and meeting management including chairing and agendas

An important role of the coordinating structure chairperson is to structure the agenda and deciding how much time is allocated to discuss or debate a particular issue. By having a more focused and strategic agenda, as well as by circulating documents sufficiently in advance of meetings to allow for meeting preparation, priority issues can be discussed in more detail.

Table 4 shows that less than 40% of DGs believe that reports submitted to the three structures are well prepared. Most key informants stated that structure agendas need to be more focused and strategic and to only include agenda items which require coordination (or are on their way to Cabinet).

Table 4: DG Survey Summary of Coordination Structure Meeting Management Effectiveness

Question	Rating (% of DGs surveyed) of		
	Clusters	IFs	MinMECs
% DGs feeling that reports submitted to structures are well prepared,	29%	64%	59%
% DGs feeling that the majority of agenda items focus on strategic items.	73%	62%	62%
% DGs feeling that meeting agendas are appropriately structured to address its roles.	78%	71%	62%
% DGs feeling that structure meetings are chaired effectively.	87%	67%	72%



Source: Impact Economix. 2013 DGs Survey..

Secretariats play a number of important roles in supporting the effective functioning of the coordination structures, including: sending out meeting agendas; making sure departments submit reports on time and ensuring the circulation of reports ahead of structure meetings; taking minutes of structure meetings; maintaining a schedule or list of activities that the structure has to resolve, as well as monitor structure progress with taking forward this schedule of activities or issues; and supporting minister's to convene meetings.

With the exception of the IF, TORs of the structures do provide detail regarding meeting management or the functioning of secretariats. As one key informant noted, decisions and guidelines regarding both MinMEC and cluster procedures and protocols have evolved over time and are reflected in minutes of various meetings.

Issues identified by key informants with respect to structure secretariats and what is not working are as follows:

a) There are not always **dedicated secretariats** for the coordination structures and whatever secretariat capacity exists is not well-resourced.

b) **Location of secretariat**. There are different perspectives as to whether secretariats should be based in the main coordinating department or elsewhere (e.g. at the Presidency in the Cabinet secretariat).

c) **Lack of response from departments/**ministers. Department/ministers are not always disciplined and do not respond to the coordinating secretariat requests for reports due.

Managing coordination issues outside the use of these meetings

The case studies also brought up how important it is to deal with issues between meetings, through for example:

- Focused **task teams** to resolve issues and develop detailed proposals.
- **Inter-provincial technical committees** reporting to MinTECHs playing an important role in enhancing national government support and strengthening monitoring mechanisms.
- Other coordination instruments, such as **memorandums of understanding** (MoUs) or IMCs were seen as allowing the executive authority to take responsibility for delivering on their own portfolio or functional mandates and for taking responsibility for taking decisions.

Effective accountability and performance mechanisms including performance targets

There are several accountability issues raised in relation to the coordination structures:

a) **Improving tracking of decisions** and progress. The improvement of information systems and knowledge management, including electronic real-time reporting systems, can enhance the functioning of coordination structures.
b) The **top-down** nature of coordination structures can actually reduce accountability of the responsible department (minister, officials) for taking decisions as ministers or DGs could state that they are waiting for the structure to meet and to take a decision.
c) Officials are not always sufficiently empowered to take **action outside of the structure meetings** to coordinate issues.
d) **Performance management systems** and coordination. Sometimes the performance management systems do not support the effective functioning of the coordination structures, to balance the trade-off with self-interest and competition between departments. DGs and ministers prioritise those issues on which their performance is measured and evaluated and that there are some coordination activities that are not well defined or integrated into these performance instruments, resulting in DGs or ministers not necessarily providing the required leadership or direction.
e) Ministers do not necessarily **hold DGs accountable** for implementing structure decisions and the same applies to DGs and lower level officials (there is not a culture of consequences).

4.3 Behaviour

4.3.1 Participation and representation in meetings of the coordination structures

Attendance levels by DGs at technical clusters improved between 2012 and 2013 from 23% to 40% but overall attendance is still low. The highest percentage of DG attendance levels was the JCPS cluster at 49%, and the cluster with the lowest percentage of DG attendance levels was the G&A cluster at 25% DG attendance. Table 5 shows that only 56% of DGs surveyed in 2013 feel that representation at clusters is adequate, only 15% for IFs and 4% for MinMECs! DGs said that

attending meetings as a valuable use of their time, but this is contradicted by them not coming to meetings. They may just not have the time.

Participation and attendance issues need to be understood within the broader context of the many demands which exist on both ministers' and DGs' time. These demands include the fact that some ministers and DGs attend at least three, if not more, clusters, MinMECs, or IFs, as well as a range of other coordination structures (e.g. IMCs). However, poor attendance by senior officials undermines the effectiveness of the clusters. Firstly, only DGs can exercise authority for taking certain decisions. Secondly, officials who are asked to attend meetings often tend to be those with free time to attend meetings and not necessarily those busy managers who add value. All of this undermines the ability of the structures to take effective decisions.

Table 5: DG Survey Summary of Participation and Representation Issues

Question	Rating (% of DGs surveyed) of		
	Clusters	IFs	MinMECs
% DGs feeling that meetings are well represented by relevant departments.	56%	45%	68%
% DGs feeling that attendance at structure meetings is by sufficiently senior officials.	53%	46%	76%
% DGs agree that attending structure meetings is a valuable use of DG's time.	87%	80%	83%
% DGs agree that their department has derived value from participating in the structure over the past year.	91%	73%	70%



Source: Impact Economix. 2013 DGs Survey.

4.3.2 Organisational culture and shared values that supports collaboration and mutual learning

Organisational culture varies across departments and spheres, but many informants noted that the culture of coordination is weak and that departmentalism dominates. The literature review pointed to the link between the effectiveness of coordination and the behaviour of leaders. Respondents identified the need for induction training to address issues related to promoting a culture of coordination.

4.3.3 Right level and mix of competencies, capabilities, capacity (knowledge, skills and attitudes)

The following issues were raised by key informants as undermining the effectiveness of coordination in general as well as the specific effectiveness of the coordination structures:

a) Many officials do not seem to understand that part of their role is to unblock implementation blockages or constraints.

b) Some DGs do not think strategically and they are more focused on managerial issues.

c) Coordination requires negotiation skills, which need to be seen as a core senior official competence. At the moment, the dominant current approach followed by departments is that other departments must do what they are told to do.

5. Conclusions and recommendations

One DG stated that "Generally people want to coordinate but they do not want to be coordinated". This illustrates the many tensions around coordination, with complex relationships and power dynamics. It appears that when a cluster involves departments where there are clear service delivery inter-dependencies (e.g. JCPS), then the chances of officials appreciating the need for coordination may be greater than when the inter-dependencies are not so clear (e.g. between health and education in the Social Cluster).

This section contains overall conclusions and recommendations which are relevant to all three coordination structures as well as broader government systems. This is then followed by structure-specific conclusions and recommendations.

5.1 Number of meetings

5.1.1 Too many meetings overall are negatively impacting on the participation in structures by sufficiently senior officials

This includes both coordination structure meetings as well as other meetings for DGs and ministers, which undermines the ability of the coordination structures to fulfil their mandates.

Recommendation:

R1 The schedule of structure meeting dates must be developed a year in advance and must coordinate with the Cabinet committee meeting schedule.

R2 The Presidency should engage with Parliament to agree on days on which departments and ministers will not be called to Parliament.

R3 POA reporting periods should be reduced from 4 per annum to 3 per annum.

Other possible options to consider include:

a) **Reducing the number of clusters**: potential advantages of this option would be that ministers and senior officials would not need to participate in as many clusters (which could improve senior-level attendance) and potentially there would be a focus on a smaller number of critical government priorities. A potential disadvantage is important issues requiring coordinated decision-making may be neglected.

b) **Reducing the numbers of departments participating** in each cluster: potential advantages of this option would be that ministers and senior officials would not need to participate in as many clusters (which could improve senior-level attendance). A potential disadvantage is that the quality of coordination decisions may not be optimal (i.e. important information from a relevant department may not be included in the decision-making process) and coordination decisions may not be (optimally) implemented by all relevant departments.

c) **Dropping Ministerial Clusters** and only having Cabinet committees: a potential advantage of this option is that it would free up space in minister's schedule for other commitments. A potential disadvantage is that all relevant ministers may not have been adequately consulted/ involved in decision-making processes prior to Cabinet and this could result in Cabinet committee debates and delays in decision-making.

R4 The Presidency should undertake a feasibility study into the use of video conferencing (as happens for clusters between Cape Town and Pretoria) to reduce the direct and indirect

costs of such meetings, e.g. using Tele-presencing technology (including a brief review of the experience with this in Australia by the COAG structures).

5.2 Quality of secretariats

5.2.1 Meeting management systems and resources are suboptimal and undermine effective functioning of the structures and their ability to fulfil their mandates:

Meetings are seen as not well enough prepared. This contributes towards poor quality decisions being taken in meetings, which also then negatively impacts on, for example, the quality of Cabinet's decision-making ability. Key issues which need to be addressed are:

- **Reports are not always received sufficiently in advance** (e.g. a week) of structure meetings, which compromises on the ability of participants to adequately prepare for meetings.
- **Secretariats are often not adequately resourced and supported** (although there are also examples of effective secretariats such as the Health MinMEC secretariat) in order to effectively carry out a number of key functions which then negatively impacts on effective meeting management and structure effectiveness (e.g. resulting in too much time spend in meetings dealing with structure administrative issues).
- The quality of meeting chairing (chairperson skills) is not always strong and this can contribute negatively to the length of meetings and the quality of decision making.

Recommendations:

R5 The TORs of the structures should include clear timeframes which Secretariats must strictly enforce for the submission of reports for coordination structure meetings, as well as ensuring that Cabinet committee reports have first been approved for submission to the Cabinet committee via the relevant cluster structure.

R6 Secretariats need to play the following roles at a high level:

a) Ensure that reports are only submitted to the coordination structures after officials have attempted to resolve issues outside of the structures.
b) Ensure that reports meet quality requirements before they are tabled. They should give feedback on report quality issues which must first be addressed before submission to the coordination structures.
c) Follow up with departments to ensure reports are submitted on time.
d) Structure meeting agendas to focus on a limited number of strategic issues which are aligned with the core mandates of the structures.
e) Take good quality minutes.
f) Follow-up to try and resolve issues between structure meetings, as well as follow-up on the status of decisions made in structure meetings.
g) Organise DG-ministerial briefings in advance of meetings.

R7 In order to be able to do this the structure secretariat role should not be seen as administrative but a high level organisational role requiring at least one dedicated senior official. The Presidency should develop job descriptions for structure secretariats to reflect this role.

5.2.2 Blurring of roles between clusters, IFs and MinMECs:

Key issues include the following:

a) Lack of **common understanding** across all DGs regarding the appropriate roles for each of the structures. This contributes to undermining the functioning of the structures.

b) The **referral** of appropriate issues between the structures does not seem take place often enough (e.g. from IFs to clusters).

c) There is not a clear picture of whether both **ministerial clusters** and Cabinet committees are needed. Dropping the former would reduce time demands, but then ministers would not have a chance of discussing issues in cluster meetings which they chair, as opposed to Cabinet committees which are chaired by the President or Deputy President , and which form part of the formal/legal imperatives of government decision-making processes.

d) There are examples where the creation of issue- and task-focused technical task teams have made important contributions to the effective coordination of developing legislation as well as improving service delivery and monitoring. However, it appears that the structures do not use this mechanism often enough.

Recommendations:

R8 The Presidency should develop refined TORs for all structures which clarify the difference in roles, mandates and operating procedures. Specific guidelines regarding the establishment and operation of appropriate technical task teams also need to be developed.

R9 To strengthen policy harmonisation and minimise the need for coordination, the Presidency should develop a set of standardised guidelines regarding policy development processes to ensure meaningful engagement and interaction between departments during the policy development process and to pro-actively address and minimise coordination issues requiring addressing at formal cluster meetings and once policy implementation has started.

5.2.3 The Presidency needs to play a stronger role in supporting coordination and the coordination structures in a number of areas, including the following:

R10 The Presidency (Cabinet Secretary and Cabinet Secretariat) need to take final decisions to approve/reject submissions into the Cabinet system if they do not comply with set guidelines.

R11 The Presidency should play a role in strengthening structure secretariats by:

a) Establishing guidelines for strengthening the resourcing and functioning of structure secretariats. This includes guidelines and procedures to address issues raised above and including: managing agendas; the report submission process; meeting schedules; time schedules; ensuring appropriate representation for agenda items; minute taking; monitoring decisions-taken. This should be for each of the coordination structures as part of developing refined TORs. Secretariats must strictly enforce regarding time-frames for the submission of reports.

b) Working with coordinating departments' secretariats to refine the strategic & unblocking focus of agendas.

c) Ensuring that departments allocate sufficient resources for coordination (e.g. structure secretariats).

d) Training and monitoring and supporting the secretariats.

e) Refining TORs to guide the effective functioning of the coordination structures.

R12 In order to do the above The Presidency should have a senior official allocated to each cluster who works with the cluster to ensure the agendas and reports are appropriate and well prepared.

R13 The Presidency needs to identify the required resources (new and/or existing), develop an implementation plan, and allocate responsibilities for playing a stronger coordination support role in the above areas.

R14 As part of the performance management process Ministers need to hold DGs accountable when departments do not report on progress to the IFs or Cabinet.

5.3 Leadership, problem-solving, accountability and weak coordination culture:

5.3.1 Leadership

The coordination case studies reviewed showed that when a coordination issue was highly visible in the public eye, and was also widely recognised to be of critical national importance, it was more likely for Ministers to provide the required level of leadership and drive to move coordination issues forward by both negotiating with fellow Ministers for support, as well as by allocating key officials with responsibility and holding them accountable for achieving key tasks (e.g. the IPP and LTSM case studies). An integrated approach requires champions, political support, and the involvement of senior public servants.

R15 For coordination to be effective ministers have to take a lead, as shown in the LTSM case study.

5.3.2 Inadequate chairing

The chairing of coordination structure meetings needs to be improved, which is closely linked to meeting management discussed below. It would also assist if chairpersonship reflected the actual co-ordination role of the Ministry/Department in that area (e.g. Rural Development should not coordinate the Economic Cluster but rather one of the lead departments, dti, EDD or National Treasury). Sub-section 5.4.2 contains recommendations related to meeting chairing.

5.3.3 There is an inadequate culture of coordination, especially in structures where service delivery processes between departments or spheres are not closely linked into an overall system

There appear to be numerous challenges in terms of a culture of coordination. These include DGs prioritising issues on which their performance is measured (self-interested behaviour), competition between departments, a reported limited strategic ability of some DGs, as well as the limited strategic focus of cluster agendas.

Recommendation:

R16 The refined TORs for the coordination structures, as well as the process to develop these refined TORs and other complementary support measures and systems, should include or address the following (drawing from Manetje and Martins. 2009):

a) Minimize the number and complexity of rules, procedures and approval processes.
b) Involve structure members in designing the rules, methods, and procedures.
c) Create information systems that allow organisational members to track their own results in "real time", including around coordination.
d) Ensure that information and influence can flow laterally and diagnostically, rather than only vertically, so favouring informal coordination at all levels.

e) Involve employees at different levels in improving coordination structure systems and procedures, including making suggestions of how coordination can be improved at operational and decision-making levels.
f) Periodically review the performance of coordination structures and be prepared to change the rule book and start over.

5.3.4 There is a need for ongoing skills development of ministers and senior officials to enhance the skills needed for effective coordination: strategic thinking, problem solving, negotiation, and meeting chairing:

Harrison (1993, p 22) indicates that for organisational change key leaders should embody the values and behaviours that typify the new culture that is desired. Organisational members should have internalised the values of the new culture and understand how it functions. It is not clear this has happened.

Recommendations:

R17 The Presidency should engage the SA School of Government (as well as possible partnerships with Higher Education Institutions) to include in the curriculum and related awards system the following:
a) Coordination, M&E and problem-solving skills.
b) Negotiation skills and meeting chairing skills. This should include a high level course and training program on chairing skills for DGs and ministers.
c) A dedicated training programme for coordination structure secretariats.
d) The Public Sector Excellence Awards (or an equivalent award initiative) needs to include an award for the best example of (or initiative illustrating) government coordination (possibly sponsored by the Presidency).

5.3.5 There is insufficient resolution of coordination issues outside of the coordination structures, over-burdening them and undermining their strategic focus and overall effectiveness:

Large formal meetings are not good forums for solving complex problems, but are more appropriate for approving issues resolved by officials prior to the formal meetings. Issues should only be brought to the structures if attempts to address these outside of the structures have been ineffective/ exhausted (with secretariats also playing a role to ensure tighter control over the report submission process to structures). Clusters/IF's should make decisions about the group of departments (and officials) responsible for specific joint/related projects. It is important to raise awareness amongst government officials that one of their key roles is to unblock implementation constraints.

Recommendations:

R18 DGs need to delegate and empower lower level officials to address coordination issues outside of the coordination structures, wherever possible, including creating dedicated task teams.

R19 The Presidency needs to take responsibility for forming and supporting ad-hoc dedicated coordination task teams to deal with difficult cross-cutting policy or strategy issues where deep differences exist between departments, and/or in the broader public, and/or strict time limits for resolving these exist. To enhance the effectiveness of these task teams, they should report directly to either the President (or deputy President), and/or a senior minister, and/or or a Cabinet committee.

R20 Revised TORs for the coordination structures must require that coordination structure decisions are clear and specific about the group of departments (and officials) responsible for specific joint/related projects.

5.3.6 Linkages between coordination structures are not always clear and need to be strengthened:

Issues identified regarding poor linkages or feedback mechanisms between coordination structures include Cabinet committee decisions not always being fed back to MinMECs and IF matters regarding policy issues are not always fed into the cluster system.

Recommendation:

R21 Revised TORs for the structures should formalise and clarify how feedback of structure decisions should take place between structures as well as how structures should refer matters/ reports to other structures (including how relevant Cabinet decisions should be communicated back to relevant structures. There should be a standing item for all IF/Cluster meeting agendae on "matters/feedback from Cabinet" pertaining to IF/Cluster work.

5.3.7 Low levels of accountability for implementing decisions made by the structures seriously undermine the effectiveness of the structures in fulfilling their mandates:

Accountability issues frequently raised by informants include the need for ministers to be more actively involved, to hold DGs to account regarding the submission of reports to the coordination structures, and departments to account for implementing decisions made by the coordination structures. Minister's performance agreements have not been properly cascaded into Strategic Plans and APPs and DGs' performance agreements and there is a lack of consequences for not implementing decisions.

Recommendations:

R21 Chairpersonship should reflect the actual co-ordination role of the ministry/department in that area (e.g. Rural Development should not coordinate the Economic Cluster but rather one of the lead departments, dti, EDD or National Treasury).

R22 There is a need for all departments to ensure that performance agreements cascade from ministerial, DG, to at least chief director levels, include stronger performance indicators and targets for coordinated outputs/outcomes, and problem-solving. The Department of Public Service and Administration should develop guidelines, and/or specific examples of refined KPIs which promote coordination and the effective functioning of the coordination structures.

5.3.8 The coordination structures need to monitor and assess their performance regularly, including through an annual assessment:

Recommendation:

R23 An annual assessment of the coordination structures needs to be designed and coordinated by the Presidency starting end 2014, and building on the revisions set in place following this evaluation. This could include a survey of the structure participants which tracks annual trends in key performance areas of the structures, some of which are

included in the 2013 DGs survey carried out for this evaluation. In addition, trends in attendance should be monitored.

5.4 Recommendations for specific structures

5.4.1 MinMECs

MinMECs have added value and worked well in a number of ways including an important role in:

a) The devolution of national and provincial powers to municipal level (Housing). This requires an integrated portfolio of ministers/MECs relevant to the power needed to support the process.
b) Identifying models for resolving service delivery blockages and in enhancing integrated service delivery at provincial level (seamless government from the citizen's perspective);
c) Inter-provincial technical committees reporting to MinTECHs can play an important role in enhancing national government support and strengthening monitoring mechanisms.

Some specific issues emerging include:

MinMECs are limited in their ability to deal with the horizontal aspects of concurrent powers

For example, both human settlements and EA regulations require active roles to be played by a range of national and provincial departments and it is not clear if MinMECs are able to effectively broaden participation beyond the core national coordinating department, and Provincial delivery department to ensure that processes are coordinated to address both vertical inter-governmental, as well as horizontal, issues. Alternatively, there may be a need for MinMECs and clusters to feed into each other on certain issues where both horizontal and vertical coordination issues require action.

Relatively low levels of agreement amongst DGs on the following MinMEC roles:

a) Development of minimum norms and standards for concurrent functions and reaching consensus on these.
b) Discuss the performance of services in order to detect failures and to initiate preventive or corrective action when necessary.
c) Consult provincial governments and, if appropriate, organised local government on the coordination and alignment within that functional area of: Strategic performance plans; Priorities, objectives and strategies across national, provincial and local governments.

It is not clear if the level of coordination taking place in MinTECHs and MinMECs regarding the coordination and alignment of strategic performance plans; priorities, objectives and strategies across national, provincial and local governments is adequate and if the ability of MinMECs to fulfil this role needs to be strengthened or not.

Some provincial MECs need to attend multiple MinMECs and can therefore become over-burdened, thus negatively impacting on attendance. Presumably this issue can only be addressed at provincial level.

Recommendations:

R24 MinMEC structures must confirm whether the scope of consultation in the context of the IGRA precludes or allows MinMECs to make decisions pertaining to national policy/

legislation. A specific issue was raised by the Health Minister that the Health MinMEC is enshrined in legislation, unlike some other structures and so has the power to take decisions.

R25 Coordination structure TORs should clarify when issues need to be referred between MinMECs and clusters. This should also look at how to address the three above-mentioned roles (see previous point 2).

R26 MinMECs' TORs need to clarify their role in the coordination and alignment of strategic performance plans; priorities, objectives and strategies across national, provincial and local governments.

R27 It may be appropriate to establish an economic development MinMEC.

5.4.2 Implementation Forums

IFs need to follow up on the focusing of indicators, and quality of reports:

Concerns were raised by key informants that the level of detail in some PoA reports is too great and that Cabinet takes a hands-off approach when reviewing PoA reports. They suggest that a more hands-on approach is needed whereby Cabinet takes resolutions per outcome. IFs need to focus on a smaller set of high level outputs and indicators and good quality reports which focus on the areas that need unblocking.

Recommendations:

R30 IFs need to decide on the following:

a) The relationship between the PICC's Management Committee and the Outcome 6 Technical and Ministerial IFs (for example, should the Outcome 6 Technical IF support the PICC Management Committee, is the Outcome 6 Ministerial Forum needed in addition to the PICC Management Committee?).
b) Lack of clarity in some cases as to what departments should fall under what outcome, with a specific examples relating to Outcomes 4 and 5 and 6.
c) The roles and responsibilities of provincial governments with respect to DAs and the achievement of targets need to be clarified and confirmed.

Annexes

Annex 1: References

Allen, 2006. The evolving government-community paradigm: Challenges for the public sector. Governments and communities in partnership: From theory to practice. Melbourne, Australia.

Australian Commonwealth. 2004. Connecting Government: Whole of Government Responses to Australia's Priority Challenges.

Australian Public Service Commission. 2010. Implementing Machinery of Government Changes: A Best Practice Guide.

Briggs, L. 2005. Synergies–New approaches to working together in government. Annual Government Business Conference: The future of the Australian Public Service. Gold Coast, Australia.

Beuselinck, 2010. Coordination in the United Kingdom in The Coordination of Public Sector Organisations. Shifting Patterns of Public Management, Basingstoke: Palgave MacMillan, 114-131.

Bird, S. Metal. 2005. Performance Indicators, Good, Bad and Ugly..J. R. Statist. Soc.168, Part 1,1–27.

Bouckaert, C, Peters, B. Gand Verhoest, G. 2010. The Coordination of Public Sector Organisations. Shifting Patterns of Public Management, Basingstoke: Palgave MacMillan.

Cameron, R. G. 2009. New Public Management Reforms in the South African public service in Journal of Public Administration, 2009, 444 (1), 910-942. Cameron, R. G. 2012. Performance Management in the Department of Labour, paper presented at 5th International SPMA Conference, Pretoria: University of Pretoria, 16-17 November.

Chakrabarti, Suma. 28 February 2012. Why we Should Take a Measured Approach to Targets. The Guardian (accessed online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2012/feb/28/why-public-managers-measure-targets).

Cohen, H. 1980. You can Negotiate Anything, Bantam, New Jersey.

Commonwealth of Australia. 2004. Connecting Government: Whole of Government Response to Australia's Priority Challenges, Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts

Council of Australian Government. 2011. Handbook for COAG Councils: A Guide for Best-practice Operations for COAG Council Secretariats. Accessed at: http://www.coag.gov.au/sites/default/files/coag_documents/Handbook_for_COAG_Councils.rtf

Council of Australian Government. 2013 .Council of Australian Governments. Accessed online at http://www.coag.gov.au/about_coag

Costa, V, M. F. 2003. Relações intergovernament aisno Brasil: desenvolvimentosrecentese perspectivas. In: MEEKISON,Peter(ed.), Relaçõesintergovernamentaisempaísesfederais, Ottawa:ForúmdasFederações).

De Bruijn, 2007. Managing Performance in the Public Sector. 2nd Edition. Abington, Oxfon,

Routledge.

Department of Basic Education. 2012. Report of the ministerial committee for LTSM report.

Department of Education. 1996. National Education Policy Act.

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Australia. 2008. Australia's system of government, Relations between levels of government, accessed online at http://www.dfat.gov.au/facts/sys_gov.html

Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation. March 2012. DPME Guideline 2.1.2: Terms of Reference for Implementation Forums.

Department of Public Service and Administration. 2006. Guidelines for Managing Joint Programmes. Pretoria.

Department of Public Service and Administration. 2008. Summary Report to the July 2008 Lekgotla. Status regarding HR delegations from EAs to HoDs in the public service. Pretoria.

Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. 2011. All about PM & C: What we do and how we do it, Common Wealth of Australia.

Dunleavy, P. 1991. Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice, London: Pearson Education.

Faria, V. E. 2002. Institutional reform and government coordination in Brazil's social protection policy, Cepal Review, 77

Gauteng Department of Education. 2011. Guidelines on the monetary allocation for Learning and Teaching Support Materials (LTSM) for 2010

Government of South Africa. 2010. Delivery Agreement Outcome-6: Part 2: An efficient, competitive, and responsive economic infrastructure network, Pretoria.

Gregory R, Tom C. 2006 Theoretical Faith and Practical Works: De-Autonomizing and Joining-Up in the New Zealand State Sector. In Autonomy and Regulation: Coping with Agencies in the Modern State. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 137-161

Gunlick, L. 1937. Notes on the Theory of Organisation in Shafritz, J. M. Hyde A. C. and Parkes, S. J. Classics of Public Administration. Belmont, California: Thomson Wadworth, pp77-85..

Gutto, S. et al. 2007. A study on Enhancing the Status, Role, Image, and Positioning of the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa.

Halligan, J. June 2008. The Impact of Horizontal Coordination in Australia. Paper for the European Consortium on Political Research Regulation & Governance conference Utrecht University.

Halligan, J. Buick, F., and O ' Flynn, J. 2011, Experiments with joined-up, horizontal and whole-of-government in Anglophone countries in Massey, A (ed.), International Handbook on Civil Service Systems, Cheltham: Edward Elgar, 74-99.

Halligan, J. Buick, F., and O ' Flynn, J. 2012, Chapter 5, Experiments with joined-up, horizontal and whole-of-government in Anglophone countries, Experiments in Anglophone countries.

Hamburger, P. 2007. 'Coordination and Leadership at the Centre of the Australia Public Service',

in R. Kochand J. Dixon (eds.) Public Governance and Leadership, Deutscher Universitats-Verlag, Wiesbaden.

Harrison, R. 1993. Diagnosing Organizational Culture: Trainer's Manual. Amsterdam: Pfeiffer & Company.

Hill, M. 2009. The Public Policy and Process, Harlow: Pearson Longman.

Hill, C.J and Lynn, L. 2005. Is Hierarchical Governance in Decline? Evidence from Empirical Research, Journal of Public Administration and Theory, 15.1 73-195.

Hodges R, Wright M, Keasey K, 2008: Corporate governance in the public services: Concepts and issues. Public Money and Management, 16(2).

Hoebel, E. A. 1966. Anthropology: the study of man. 3rd ed. McGraw-Hill.

Hood, C. 1991. A Public Management for all seasons? Public Administration 69 (1): 3-19.

Hood, C. 2005. The Idea of Joined-Up Government: A Historical Perspective in Bognador, V(e.,) Joined-Up Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 19-42.

Hood, C, 2006. Gaming in Target-world: The Targets Approach to Managing British Public Services, Public Administration Review, July/August, 515-522.

Hood, C. 2007. Public Service Management by Numbers: Why Does it Vary? Where Has it Come From? What Are the Gaps and the Puzzles? Public Money & Management, 27:2, 95-102.

House of Commons, England. 2005. Public Service Agreements.

Hughes O. E. 2003. Public Management and Administration. An Introduction 3rd edition. New York: MacMillan.

Human Rights Commission. 2012. Monitoring and Investigating the Delivery of Primary Learning Materials to Schools Country-Wide.

Impact Economix. July 2013. Coordination Survey of Directors General undertaken for Presidency: DPME.

Infrastructure Development Cluster: Program of Action Quarterly Progress Report. 2012. Pretoria.

Jackson, P. M., and L. Stainsby. 2000. "Managing Public Sector Networked Organizations." Public Money & Management 20 (1):11-6.

Kamensky, John. 2010. UK Public Service Agreements. Accessed online at http://www.businessofgovernment.org/blog/business-government/uk-public-service-agreements.

Kernaghan, K. 2005/ 'Moving towards the virtual state: integrating services and service channels for citizen-centred delivery', International Review of Administrative Sciences, 71, 119–30.

Kernaghan, K. and D. Siegel. 1987. Public Administration in Canada, Toronto, ON: Methuen. Kraak, A. 2011. Horizontal Coordination, Government Performance and National Planning: The Possibilities and Limits of the South African, Politikon: 38(3), 343-365.

Ling, 2002. Delivering Joined-Up Government in the UK: Dimensions, Issues and Problems, Public Administration 80(4), 615-642.

Lipsky, 1980. Lipsky, M. Street-Level Bureaucracy: The Critical Role of Street-Level Bureaucrats, New York, Russell Sage Foundation.

Manetje, O. and Martins, N. 2009. The relationship between organisational culture and organisational commitment. Southern African Business Review Volume 13 Number 1.

Martins, N. & Martins, E. 2003. 'Organisational culture', In Robbins, S.P., Odendaal A. & Roodt, G. (eds), Organisational Behaviour: Global and Southern African Perspectives. Cape Town: Pearson Education South Africa.

Mansholt. 2008. Graduate School of Social Sciences: Governance structures or mechanisms of governance: What is it and why do we need them? Slide10: Four groups of coordination mechanisms. Referenced online athttp://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/publicat/2009/ActNowBC/ref-bib-eng.php#mgs.

Maynard-Moodley, S. and Musheno, M. 2009. Cops, Teachers, Counsellors: Stories from the Front Lines of Public Service. Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

McCourt, W. 2001. The NPM agenda for service delivery: A suitable model for developing countries? in McCourt, Wand Minogue, M. The Internationalisation of Public Management. Reinventing the Third World State. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 107–128.

McCourt, W. 2012. Reform Implementation Review, World Bank: Washington unpublished paper. McCormack M. H. 1997. On Negotiating, Newstar PR

Minogue M. 1998. Changing the state: Concepts and practice in the reform of the public sector. In: Minogue M, Polidano Cand Hume, D (eds.) Beyond the New Public Management, Changing Ideas and Practices in Governance. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 17–37.

Moore, S. and Shin-Yu Tu. 1997. Designation & Classification of Hazardous Waste, http://awd.csiro.au/Soilsoc1.aspx[Accessed26/05/2013].

Mulgan G. 2002. Joined Up Government. Past, Present and Future, Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration, 105, September, 25-29..

Mulgan, G. 2005. Joined-Up Government: Past, Present and Future in Bognador, V(ed.) Joined-Up Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 175-187.

National Planning Commission, South Africa. 2011.National Development Plan, Pretoria.

New Zealand Government: State Services Commission. 2008. Factors for Successful Coordination: Helping State Agencies Coordinate Effectively, (available online at: http://www.ssc.govt.nz/sites/all/files/Factors%20spreadsheet.pdf) [Accessed23/05/2013]

Page E. 2005. Joined Up Government and the Civil Service in Bognador, V. (ed.). Joined Up Government, Oxford: Oxford University.

Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 2009. Oversight And Accountability Model: Asserting Parliament's Oversight Role In Enhancing Democracy.

Perri 6, 2004. Joined-up government in the western world in comparative perspective: a preliminary literature review and exploration. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 14.1, 103(36).

Perri6, 2005. Joined-up Government in the West Beyond Britain. A Provisional Assessment, in

Bognador, V (ed.) Joined-Up Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 43-106.

Peters, 1998a. Managing Horizontal Government: The Politics of Co-ordination, Public Administration (76), 295-311.

Peters, 1998 b. Managing Horizontal Government: The Politics of Co-ordination, Canadian Centre for Management Development. Research Paper no 21.

Polidano C. 1999. The new public management in developing countries. Manchester: Institute for Developmental Policy and Management (IDPM), University of Manchester, IDPM Public Policy and Management Working Paper No 13.

Pollitt, C. 2003. Joined-Up Government: A Survey: Political Studies Review (1), 34-49.

Pollitt. C. 2004. Castles Built-On Sand? Agencies in Latvia. In: Pollitt C and Talbot C (eds.) Unbundled Government. A Critical Analysis Of The Global Trend To Agencies, Quangos And Contractualisation, London: Routledge, 283-296.

Pollitt, C. 2006a. Performance Management in Practice: A Comparative Study of Executive Agencies, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 16-25-44.

Pollitt, C. 2006b Performance In formation for Democracy. The Missing Link? Evaluation, 12(1),38-
55.

Pollitt C and Bouckaert, G. 2011. Public Management Reform. A Comparative Analysis: New Public Management, Governance and the Neo-Weberian State, Third Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Presidency: South Africa. Undated. Functioning of the Integrated System of Governance (presentation).

Presidency: South Africa. 2001. Democratic Governance: A Restructured Presidency at Work.

Presidency: South Africa. 2008.Review of the Government Cluster System. Pretoria.

Presidency: South Africa. 27 May 2010. Guide to the Outcomes Approach.

Pressly, D. 27 March 2013. New electricity middleman nears lift-off as ISMO Bill is finalised (Available online at http://www.iol.co.za/business/news/new-electricity-middleman-nears-lift-off-as-ismo-bill-is-finalised-1.1492346#.Utz-rLQaKUk).

Rabin, B. 2000. The Government Performance and Results Act and the Tradition of Federal Management Reform, Journal of Public Administration and Research Theory, 10. 1,111-135.

Public Service Commission. 2008. Consolidated Report on Inspections of Service Delivery Sites: Departments of Education. Pretoria.

Rezende, F. 2006. Brasil: Conflito Federativoe Reforma Tributária. In:Rezende,F.(ed.), Desafiosdo Federalismo Fiscal,Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora.

Sadler B, 1997. International Study of the Effectiveness of Environmental Assessment. Environmental Assessment in a changing world: evaluating practice to improve performance.

Saviani, D. 2010. Organizaçãoda educaçãonacional: Sistemae Conselho Nacionalde Educação, Planoe Fórum Nacional de Educação, Educação & Sociedade,31(112),769-787.

Schneider, A. 2007. Governance Reform and Institutional Change in Brazil: Federalism and Tax, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 45(4), 475-498.

Southern and East African Consortium for Monitoring Education Quality (SACMEQ). 2010. The Quality of Primary School Inputs in South Africa, 2010.

Souza, C. 2012. Brazil: The Prospects of a Center-Constraining Federation in a Fragmented Polity, Publius, 32(2), 23-48.

Souza, C. 1997. Constitutional engineering in democratic Brazil: the politics of federalism and decentralization, New York & London: Macmillan Press Ltd and St. Martin's Press.

Talbot, C. 2004. A radical departure? Executive agencies in Jamaica. In: Pollitt, C and Talbot C (eds. Unbundled Government. A critical analysis of the global trend to agencies, quangos and contractualisation. London: Routledge, 297-315.

Talbot, C. 2005. Performance Management in Ferlie E, Lynn Land Pollitt, C (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Public Management. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 491-517.

Talbot, C. 2010. Performance in Government. The Evolving System of Performance and Evaluation, Measurement, Monitoring and Management in the United Kingdom. Washington: The World Bank, ECD Working Paper Series, 24.

United Nations, 2005. World Public Sector Reform Report, Unlocking the Human Potential for Public Sector Reform, CH1 ,New York

Victorian State Services Authority 2007. Victorian Approaches To Joined Up Government: An Overview. Melbourne.

Wagner, J.A III. 1995. 'Studies of individualism-collectivism: effects on cooperation groups', Academy of Management Journal, 38: 152–172.

Annex 2: Glossary

Term	Definition
Accountability	A social relationship where an acTOR (an individual or an agency) feels an obligation to explain and justify his or her conduct to some significant other (the accountability forum, accountee, specific person or agency) (Gutto, 2007). Obligation to demonstrate that work has been conducted in compliance with agreed rules, standards, and targets set and report accurately on work done(DPME, 2013).
Coordination	A process in which two or more parties take one another into account for the purpose of bringing together their decisions and/or activities into harmonious or reciprocal relation' (Kernaghan and Siegel, 1987, p. 263). 'the development of ideas about joint and holistic working, joint information systems, dialogue between agencies, process of planning and making decisions' Perri (2004:106). The all-important duty of interrelating the various parts of the work (Gunlick, 1937). 'The instruments and mechanisms that aim to enhance the voluntary or forced alignment of tasks and efforts within the public sector. These mechanisms are used in order to create a greater coherence and to reduce redundancy, lacunae and contradictions within policies, implementation or management' (Bouckaert et al. 2010). The sharing of information, resources and responsibilities to achieve a particular outcome (New Zealand State Services Commission. 2008. Factors for Successful Coordination).
Culture	The ideas, customs, and social behaviour of a particular people or society (Oxford Dictionary). An integrated system of learned behaviour patterns which are characteristic of the members of a society and which are not a result of biological inheritance (Hoebel 1966).
Departmental-ism	Hood (2005: 22-23) refers to Departmentalism - the tunnel vision, mutual export of problems and preoccupation with defending institutional turf in what has been termed 'vertical silos'.
Delivery Agreement	A negotiated agreement between key partners who will work together to deliver on an outcome. The lead coordinating department will provide the leadership and will be assisted by all key role players (Presidency, 2010).
Effectiveness	The extent to which objectives are achieved or expected to be achieved, against predetermined and stated objectives.
Evidence	Signs or indications of something (www.oxforddictionaries.com):
Harmonisation	make consistent or compatible (www.oxforddictionaries.com).
Horizontal management/c coordination	The coordination and management of a set of activities between two or more organizational units,[which] do not have hierarchical control over each other and where the aim is to generate outcomes that cannot be achieved by units working in isolation (Halligan, 2012).
Impact	The medium to long-term results of achieving specific outcomes.
Indicators	Quantitative or qualitative factor or variable that provides a simple and reliable means to measure achievement, to reflect the changes connected to an intervention, or to help assess the performance of an organisation.(DPME, 2013)
Input	The financial, human, and material resources used for the delivery of outputs.

Term	Definition
	(DPME, 2013).
Integrated service delivery	The process of bringing, and fitting, together government services in order to provide seamless services to citizens (Kernaghan, 2005).
Joined-Up Government (JUG)	A group of responses to the perception that services had become fragmented and that this fragmentation was preventing the achievement of important goals of public policy….It is based on the view that important goals of public policy cannot be delivered through the separate activities of existing organisations, but neither can they be delivered by creating a new 'super agency'. It therefore seeks to align the activities of formally separate organisations towards particular goals of public policy." (Ling, 2002, p. 616).
Joint programme	A national development priority, the planning and implementation of which requires the involvement of various organs of state either within a particular sphere of government, or in different spheres of government. a) Programmes that require a cross-departmental involvement in the planning, budgeting and delivery of services. b) A number of departments are often responsible for a specific aspect of the programme, but none is responsible for it in its entirety. c) Programmes that require integration rather than mere co-ordination. (DPSA, 2006).
Law	A law sets out standards, procedures and principles which must be followed.
Leadership	A process whereby an individual influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal (Northouse, 2007). Organising a group of people to achieve a common goal (Wikipedia),
Logical framework	Management tool used to improve the design of an intervention mostly at project level. It involves identifying inputs, outputs outcomes, impact, indicators, and assumptions and risks that may influence success or failure
Negotiation	Discussion aimed at reaching an agreement. Negotiating is the process of getting the best terms once the other side starts to act on their interest (McCormack, 1997). Negotiation is a field of knowledge and endeavour that focuses on gaining the favour of people from whom we want things (Herb Cohen, 1982).
Organisational culture	A basic definition of organisational culture is necessary to provide a point of departure in the quest for an understanding of the phenomenon. Martins and Martins (2003, p 380) state the general definition of organisational culture as "a system of shared meaning held by members, distinguishing the organisation from other organisations".. In relation to the above definition, Arnold (2005, p 625) indicates that "organisational culture is the distinctive norms, beliefs, principles and ways of behaving that combine to give each organisation its distinct character". These two definitions suggest that organisational culture distinguishes one organisation from another organisation. Therefore, organisational culture is to an organisation what personality is to an individual (Johnson, 1990).
Oversight	"In the South African context, oversight is a constitutionally mandated function of legislative organs of state to scrutinise and oversee executive action and any organ of state. It follows that oversight entails the informal; and formal, watchful, strategic ,and structured scrutiny exercised by legislatures in respect of the implementation of laws, the application of the budget, and the strict observance of statutes and the Constitution. In addition and most importantly, it involves overseeing the effective management of government departments by

Term	Definition
	individual members of Cabinet in pursuit of improved service delivery for the achievement of a better quality of life for all citizens" (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa: Undated).
Performance indicators	A pre-determined signal that a specific point in a process has been reached or result achieved. The nature of the signal will depend on what is being tracked and needs to be very carefully chosen. In management terms, an indicator is a variable that is used to assess the achievement of results in relation to the stated goals/objectives (DPME, 2013).
Performance measurement	A system for assessing performance against stated goals and objectives (DPME, 2013).
Performance targets	Quantifications of desired goals. They describe what specific inputs and activities should achieve over a specified time period. They are specific quantitative or qualitative goals against which actual outputs or outcomes will be compared (DPME, 2013).
Performance standards	The minimum acceptable or expected level of performance (DPME, 2013).
Policy	A policy outlines what a ministry hopes to achieve and the methods and principles it will use to achieve them. It states the goals of the ministry. A policy document is not a law but it will often identify a need for new laws in order to be able to achieve its goals.
Policies, strategies, programmes and projects	Statements of what government seeks to achieve through its work and why. Strategies are sequentially structured descriptions of how these policies will be enacted. Programmes (outside of the budgeting context) are high-level, big-picture plans showing how strategies will be implemented. Projects are specific conceptually-linked sets of activities intended to achieve particular results that will lead to the achievement of programme goals.
Programme management	The co-ordinated organisation, direction and implementation of a portfolio of projects and activities that together achieve outcomes and realise benefits that are of strategic importance.
Silo mentality	Page (2005:141) gives a lengthy exposition of silo mentality-It refers to a position where policy problems are defined, processed and handled on the basis of the intellectual and physical resources of the particular organisation that is handling it (see also Mulgan, 2005).

Annex 3: Detailed Methodology

The overall methodology is summarised below:



Each of the methodological components is further elaborated upon below.

A2.1 Analytic Framework and International Case Studies

This analytical framework was developed to guide the evaluation of government coordination systems. This framework identifies key enablers and factors which support effective coordination. The framework provides a coherent tool to focus the evaluation process on the most salient and pertinent coordination issues in government. The framework drew from best practices and lessons, as well as the TOR for this evaluation.

The international case studies sought to identify lessons learnt with respect to coordination generally, and specifically coordination structures, in relation to coordination enablers and success factors. The case studies examined the coordination experiences and selected structures from Brazil, United Kingdom, and Australia.

A2.2 Key informant interviews:

The key informant interviews targeted at key officials who participate(d) in the clusters, implementation forums and MinMECs. These officials were mainly Director Generals, Ministers, and Outcome Managers/ Facilitators from DPME. The DPME selected these officials and Ministers using criteria that included those who had been participating in the coordination structures for a significant period of time as well as those who had strong views about the functioning of the structures.

The table below summaries the key informants approached and successfully interviewed in this evaluation as well as the number of targeted and successfully completed interviews:

Table 6: Key informant interviews conducted

Structure	Outcome	Target interviews	Number conducted	List of respondents interviewed
Economic cluster/IF	4: Employment	4	7	Outcome 4 Facilitator X2 Minister of Tourism DG National Treasury Chief Director Mineral Resources DG Economic Development DG Trade and Industry
Economic cluster/IF	5: Skills	4	2	DG Science and Technology Outcome 5 Facilitator
Economic cluster/IF	7: Rural Communities	4	1	Outcome 7 Facilitator
Economic cluster/IF	10: Environment	4	3	Outcome 10 Facilitator DG: Environmental Affairs MEC Agriculture: Gauteng
Education IF/MinMEC	1: Education	5	5	DG: Basic Education Outcome 1 Facilitator Deputy Director General: Curriculum Director: LTSM Chief Director: Further Education training services
Health IF/MinMEC	2: Health	5	2	Minister of Health DG Health Outcome 2 Facilitator
Human Settlements IF/MinMEC	8: Human Settlements	5	2	DG Human Settlements Outcome 8 Facilitator
G&A cluster/IF	12: Public Service	5	5	DG Public Service Commission DG: COGTA Outcome 12 Facilitator DG Public Service and Administration Head of Department: Outcomes
Local Governance IF/MinMEC	9: Local Governance	5	0	
JCPS cluster/IF	3: Safety	5	3	Minister of Home Affairs DG Justice Outcome 3 Facilitator
Infrastructure cluster/IF	6: Infrastructure	5	3	Minister: National Planning commission Outcome 6 Facilitator DG Public Enterprises
Rural MinMEC	7: Rural Communities	5	3	Western Cape MEC: Agriculture and Rural Development Western Cape Acting DDG Agriculture Gauteng MEC: Agriculture and Rural Development
Environment MinMEC	10: Environment	5	2	DG: Environmental Affairs Gauteng MEC: Agriculture and Rural Development
TOTAL		56	38	

A2.3 DG Survey:

A survey was conducted with Director Generals who attended a FOSAD workshop held in August 2013 (in order to enhance response rates). The survey questionnaire was printed and all the DGs present were asked to complete the survey. The DGs who were absent from the meeting were sent the questionnaire electronically. The questions in the survey covered roles and responsibilities; participation, decision making and structure meeting management issues. A total of 34 of 48 DGs completed the survey. Figure 3 below shows the numbers of DGs that participated in this survey across 5 clusters. The highest number of DGs was in the Governance and Administration cluster (10 respondents); followed by the social cluster with 9 respondents. The least number was in the infrastructure cluster, with 2 respondents.

Figure 3: Clusters respondent participates in



Figure 4 shows the representation of implementation forums among the DGs that participated in the survey. The highest number of DGs was in the Outcome 4 – Employment with 8 representatives whilst the least was in health outcome with just one representative.

Figure 4: Implementation forum the respondent participates in



Note: some DGs participate in more than one implementation forum.

A2.4 South African Coordination Case Studies

As part of the broader review of the government coordination systems, outcome facilitators were asked to state the areas within their clusters/implementation forums /MinMECs where coordination was either handled well or poorly.

The **purpose** of the case studies was to:

i. Better understand in some depth the specific coordination roles played (or not played) by the 3 coordination structures in practice;
ii. Inform an understanding of the impacts of the coordination structures (i.e what kinds of benefits could be linked to a coordination issue being resolved, or costs of not resolving a coordination issue) in terms of either ensuring an issue requiring coordination is dealt with well or poorly;
iii. Inform potential improvements to the coordination structures (triangulating the case study information with the key informants, coordination survey, and coordination structures review of meeting minutes data).

The following 6 case study issues were identified by the Presidency: DPME in consultation with Outcome Managers/ Facilitators:

Figure 5: Selected SA Government Coordination Case Studies[2]

Issues involving coordination	Issue dealt with by Cluster Structure	Issue dealt with by MinMEC	Issue dealt with by Implementation Forum
Dealt with well		1. **Textbook challenges**, set up well functioning monitoring system (Contact Thabo - HeadCom, Council of Education Ministers) 2. **Accreditation of the Metro's with the Housing Function**: Complex vertical transfer/assignment of the function to six metro's negotiated through a horizontal arrangement of the 4 affected provinces and their metro representatives. (Contact Ahmedi)	3. **Finalisation of EIA process** (Contact Mohlago) 4. Regulation for creation of independent power producers (Cluster – contact Mahesh
Dealt with poorly	5. **Establishment of the Border Management Agency** (contact Joy) 6. Industrial relations in mining and agriculture (contact Rudi)		

A2.5 Coordination Structure document review

This review included structure meeting attendance registers, structure meeting minutes and other documents such as Terms of Reference for the Clusters.

[2] Case studies 5-6 in the table could not be completed within the agreed time-frame due to the non-availability of senior officials which resulted in only one completed interview for each of these case two studies.

i. Attendance register analysis

Structure meeting attendance registers were analysed for all the meetings held between 2012 and 2013. Graphs of the number of DGs in attendance were constructed. These results have been triangulated with other data sources in relevant sections of this report.

ii. Structure meeting minute analysis

The minutes from the structure meetings were requested from relevant structure secretariats. The number of decisions made in these structures were analysed by type and presented in graphs. These results are also presented in relevant sections throughout this report.

A2.6 Capacity building

This evaluation was also instrumental in building capacity of young and emerging evaluators. One young evaluator from DPME was trained in analysing structure meeting minutes. Another official from the Presidency was trained and he assisted in analysing attendance registers from the cluster meetings. The service provider team also had a young African researcher who actively participated in the whole evaluation exercise. In addition, two of the senior researchers on the team were PDIs.

A2.7 Limitations and Challenges

The following are some of the limitations and challenges experienced:

- Some requested data sets could not be obtained for security reasons as well as availability issues (for instance JCPS cluster meeting minutes and Ministerial Cluster minutes);
- Some interviews could not be secured despite several requests and follow ups (e.g. DG for Rural Development and the following Ministers; Economic Development, Rural Development, Justice, Education) due to the busy schedules of ministers and senior officials.
- Gaps in information requested e.g. some coordination structure meeting minutes not available.

Case studies were limited in depth due to limited access to information on what discussions happened within the coordination structures, as well as conversations outside of these structures between Ministers and senior officials. The case studies required access to confidential information contained in minutes of coordination structures, as well as Cabinet committee decisions (which were not made available to the researchers), as well as input from Director Generals participating in the coordination structure meetings and who were difficult to access due to their busy schedules. Case studies are vitally important with respect to evaluating the effectiveness of coordination structures due to the difficult in obtaining data on successful coordination and is an important area warranting further research in future.

Minutes were analysed in DPME's offices for security concerns. The process of obtaining minutes (which the Presidency facilitated) of the coordination was laborious as it took about 3 months to obtain some of the structure minutes, and even then many of the requested minutes were still not obtained before the project research deadline. We received access to a limited number of minutes from the following structures: Infrastructure cluster/IF, Local Government IF/MinMEC, Environment MinMEC; and no access to minutes from Human Settlements IF/MinMEC, Rural Development MinMEC, and Justice, Crime Prevention, and Security Cluster/IF. This situation may be indicative of the lack of a centralised efficient knowledge management system and/or

secretariat function, especially for MinMECs and is an area which requires further attention by the Presidency.

One of the challenges of surveying senior government officials (in this case DGs) is that they may be wary of confidentiality issues and therefore of providing overly negative comments or responses. Despite the DGs survey questionnaire stating that responses would be treated both confidentially and anonymously, we believe that the responses may have erred on the less critical side, especially regarding the “agree-neutral-disagree” questions and DGs selecting “neutral” instead of “disagree” or “strongly disagree”. It may therefore be more appropriate not to use the “neutral” category when there is the possibility that respondents may be wary of providing negative responses. It may also be important for researchers to personally re-assure respondents regarding confidentiality and anonymity, as opposed to relying on respondents reading this on the questionnaire form.

Annex 4: Detailed Coordination Analytic Framework

Dimension	Key success factors	Enablers
Mandate	Clear mandates captured in legislative/policy framework High levels of political and bureaucratic commitment to vision and coordination, as well leadership; – stakeholder relationships that are underpinned by a collaborative approach. – trust, confidence and shared responsibility. Clear and shared vision across departments and spheres of government Clear and appropriate coordination roles (both ministers, senior officials, as well as coordination structures) at different levels	Political and bureaucratic leadership Common and shared vision Strong Cabinet able to take whole of government decisions Legal frameworks Outcome focus Priorities identified
Systems/ Processes	Effective accountability and performance mechanisms (including the effective use of performance agreements, KPIs/ targets for cross-cutting collaboration, formal agreements for horizontal and/or inter-governmental collaboration and effective use of dispute resolution approaches and mechanisms). Sufficient resources to support effective functioning of coordination structures (including effective meeting management systems, secretariat support, meeting preparation, agenda setting and management, information sharing, decision-making).	Appropriate governance and accountability frameworks Effective monitoring and reporting and evaluation Two way communication Integrated state-wide planning Resource allocation and budget systems Accountability and performance management IT and information sharing systems Preparedness to innovate & take risks Flexible and adaptable approaches
Behaviours	Organisational culture and shared values that supports collaboration/ joint working, learning from evidence and coordination Right level and mix of competencies, capabilities, capacity (knowledge, skills and attitudes) as well as representation on, and participation in, coordination structures.	Organisational culture to foster coordination, cooperation, collaboration, communication and coexistence.

Annex 5: Coordination Case Studies

1. Case study 1: Regulation of independent power producers (IPPs)

Background

The infrastructure development cluster (IDC) was tasked by Cabinet in 2009 to draft legislation for the establishment of the Independent System and Market Operator (ISMO) to ensure that Independent Power Producers (IPPs) receive fair treatment and that there is non-discrimination between IPPs and the buyer of power generated by IPPs. The IDC's mandate is to ensure the implementation of economic infrastructure projects and reports on these to Cabinet (www.gov.za). It comprises the Department of Transport, Department of Energy (DoE), Department of Water Affairs, Department of Public Enterprises (DPE), and Department of Cooperative Governance, the Presidency, and National Treasury (NT). An Energy Inter-ministerial Committee (IMC) was also established and consists of the DPE Affairs, NT, Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, dti, and the Presidency and other stakeholders include Eskom (Government of South Africa: Delivery Agreement Outcome-6: Part 2.. 2010: p.13)

The following progress has been reported as part of the quarterly PoA reports submitted to the infrastructure cluster:

- A ring-fenced entity for the procurement of electricity from IPPs has been established, with contracts already signed with four IPPs and 277MW of electricity added to the national grid as part of the initiative to supplement Eskom's electricity generation capacity to ensure security of electricity supply (POA report, undated).
- The Economic Sector, Employment and Infrastructure Development (ESEID) Cabinet committee approved the draft ISMO establishment Legislation in March 2011, for tabling at Cabinet. Regulation on licensing is to be introduced requiring Eskom to ring-fence regulatory accounts. A ring-fenced ISMO has been established within Eskom. An ISMO bill has been enacted creating the framework for the establishment of ISMO as a separate legal entity. Financial, legal and technical due diligence was conducted (IDC PoA report 2012).

Findings:

Mandates

The Department of Transport is responsible for chairing and leading the cluster and reporting on the IPP issue to the Cabinet. The Department of Energy is responsible for the formulation of IPP and ISMO legislation and regulations and the Department of Public Enterprise for Eskom.

The infrastructure cluster departments are very clear on what their mandate is and the legislative and policy frameworks which govern their work and the issue of crafting legislation and regulations for the creation of independent power producers (Electricity Regulation Act (ERA) No. 4 of 2006 and the National Energy Act of 2008 (no. 34 of 2006). The Department of Energy (DoE) gazetted the Electricity Regulations on New Generation Capacity under the ERA in May 2011. The New Generation Regulations establish rules and guidelines that are applicable to the undertaking of an IPP Bid Programme and the procurement of an IPP for new generation capacity (Eskom. Undated).

The main task with regards to the creation of IPPs in terms of the outcome six delivery agreement is to put in place the ISMO Act which must be passed by Parliament and signed by the President. An ISMO task team, consisting of DoE, DPE, NT and Eskom was set up to prepare inputs for the processing of the ISMO bill (Energy Portfolio Committee, 1 February 2013).

The Cabinet memo sent to Cabinet members contained detailed progress on the delivery note and the ISMO bill as well as the challenges faced by the cluster in terms of the conflict of interest faced by the DPE and Eskom. Both the pros and cons of establishing an ISMO through legislation was captured in the Cabinet memo. In the main it was found that the Cabinet memo presented a balanced view for Cabinet to make an informed decision with regards to the establishment of the ISMO and continue with processing of the ISMO bill.

Clear and appropriate roles were set for the various departments for the processing of the ISMO bill. The DPE is responsible for the formulation for the ISMO and ensuring that appropriate inputs are made by key stakeholders and that the process remains on track for Cabinet to make meaningful decisions. The former Minister of Energy, Ms Dipuo Peters drove the process by interacting with her peers on the issue as well as appointing sufficient high level resources (DDG and chief director) to manage the process. The former Minister also piloted the bill through Parliament and ensured that it had the support of all political parties on the Energy Portfolio Committee (EPC), which has resulted in the bill been passed by the EPC a few months ago (Pressly, 27 March 2013).

Systems and processes

The relationship between the political and administrative level showed high levels of commitment and leadership in terms of the tasks assigned to both the politicians and executive officials tasked by the EPC of Parliament to conduct a due diligence and transfer of transmission and assets from Eskom into ISMO. The task team consisted of the Deputy Director General (DDG) responsible for Policy, Planning and Clean Energy and representatives of the NT and DPE as well as Eskom. The scope of work of the task team was clearly defined by the EPC (Energy Portfolio Committee. 2013).

The drafting of the ISMO bill was smoothly facilitated because the cluster had a well-functioning and well-resourced secretariat that prepared and processed meetings because important decisions had to be taken by the cluster (Outcome 6 Facilitator). Similarly, the DGs of the respective departments met in the infrastructure cluster to iron out all the technical issues pertaining to the drafting of the bill.

The report submitted to the Cabinet committee was of high quality which resulted in broader discussions of the bill. Similarly, the presentation made to the EPC by the ISMO task team focused on issues that would come up in the establishment of the bill and flagged these issues for further recommendations by the EPC for the drafting of the bill (Energy Portfolio Committee 2013).

The former Minister of Energy was very focused on the outcome of the bill and the detail of the delivery agreement. The former Minister also engaged her fellow ministers in the National Treasury and Department of Public Enterprises which resulted in these Departments making valuable inputs into the proposed bill and strengthening the collaboration and cooperation with these Departments in ensuring the attainment of the objectives and deliverables of the delivery agreement (interviewee, outcome six facilitator).

Performance agreements of the executive and senior management of the DoE were also clearly aligned to the Delivery Agreement for Outcome 6 which was signed by the relevant ministers. This gave urgency to the issue of the establishment IPPs and drafting of the ISMO bill because the political and administrative level were clear of who would be held accountable for what as well as what their respective roles would be to achieve the set targets.

Eskom was consulted to create a win-win situation given that Eskom's main concern was that it would lose its transmission assets for the delivery of energy should it be moved to the ISMO. Public hearings conducted by the task team were also held for the establishment of the ISMO and the transfer of transmission assets of Eskom to the ISMO. Concerns raised by the public had influenced the decision of the EPC to further process the bill or to put it on hold until government and Eskom could come up with proposed solutions around issues raised about the transmission of assets, willing buyer-willing seller as well as the alignment with existing legislation in terms of the ERA, the National Energy Regulator of South Africa, and ISMO.

Behaviours

The DoE has been instrumental in establishing and fostering good coordination between the departments tasked in the cluster to draft the Bill. What further enhanced the relationship is that the drafting of the bill is a DoE competence. This situation fostered a relationship where departments were prepared to share information for mutual and public benefit and attain the national objective, enhance the capacity of each other, share resources and responsibilities as well as share the rewards of tackling the issue speedily.

The right departments were chosen to work on the issue and report to Cabinet and the right officials from each department were chosen to collaborate and cooperate. The officials chosen to work on the issue in the cluster had the right level of executive powers and delegations and the right mix of competencies, capabilities and capacity..

The cost of time spent participating in joint activities by government, parliament and outside organisations such as Eskom and NEDLAC have proven and still proves to be mutually beneficial to all parties involved in the process to draft the bill and a positive impact on coordination. The cluster played, and is still playing, a significant role in ensuring the issue does not become a DoE issue alone but also creates a platform for NT and DPE to iron out the differences between them and create a win-win situation. The EPC also created a platform for Eskom and NEDLAC to participate in the issue through the task team. This enabled the cluster and the IF to work with parliament and feedback to the Cabinet committee through quality reports on the issue. The bill has been passed by the EPC and is still being deliberated in the NCOP and the EPC of parliament.

Conclusions

The coordination structures both within government and parliament made a large impact in ensuring that the ISMO issue takes priority and is dealt with in a well-coordinated way by creating a platform for departments to work in a relationship of collaboration and cooperation. The DoE on its own would not have moved on the issue as quickly as it did if the cluster and IF did not create the space for departments to iron out its differences through a negotiated process and find win-win solutions. DoE was well placed as the department that took the lead as it is the department's competence. This has highlighted the importance of ensuring that the right department with the right competence leads the issue.

The cluster clearly played a role in ensuring that the delivery agreement was in place to address government expectations and that the roles and responsibilities of each department involved were clear. The IF (which consisted of DDGs, CDs, directors and deputy directors) also played a role in terms of the addressing the technical aspects of the delivery agreement.

The process of drafting the bill has in a way inculcated the benefits of joined-up government within and outside of government. It is also clear from the way that the issue was coordinated that it generated a sense of shared accountability for a shared outcome. The DoE was not the only department receiving recognition, but all the other departments involved and the cluster as a whole which points to the issue of the importance of aligning rewards and incentives for supporting horizontal cross-cutting initiatives/issues. At the political level the former Minister of Transport pushed the issue hard and was focused on the outcome of getting the bill through parliament. The former Minister of DoE provided legitimate leadership in driving the process and tabling the bill in a short space of time thereby addressing government expectations that the bill would be approved and passed by parliament and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) and ensuring IPPs are fully on board to address the issue of more electricity generation which would benefit SA as a whole.

In conclusion, the way in which this issue was coordinated is an example of good coordination. The key success factors which supported effective coordination by the coordination structures are as follows:

- Effective and strong leadership demonstrated by the former Minister of Energy.
- The cluster was very outcome focused given the urgency to accelerate legislation. There was effective monitoring and reporting on progress in the drafting of the bill.
- Accountability and performance management: the drafting of the ISMO bill was clearly stated as a priority deliverable in the Outcome 6 DA which reinforced the urgency of the issue and made accountability for addressing it clear.

2. Case study 2: Education Implementation Forum/MinMEC; Learner, teacher, support materials (LTSM) (textbooks)

Background

This case study examines how Learner, Teacher Support Materials (LTSM) issues have been dealt with in terms of some of the institutional arrangements driving decision-making, as well as inter-sphere processes and coordination instruments in the sector.

The case study makes observations about key factors impacting on effective coordination, including relevant policy, legislative and programmatic measures implemented to improve coordination. The study also makes observations about key coordination constraints, contradictions and opportunities, and draws conclusions about lessons to inform potential future refinements to government coordination.

Finally, the case study concludes that improvements in LTSM delivery in 2012/2013 are largely explained by improvements in coordination of the LTSM value chain, and these include streamlined procurement processes, mainstreamed policy regime, and enhanced institutional capacity and support mechanisms.

Findings

Reform trends that worked

Major reforms on LTSM coordination started in earnest after the 2011 textbook delivery saga in Limpopo (which is extensively cited as a major turning point on coordination of LTSM at the Department of Basic Education (DBE). Formal investigations by the Presidency pointed to major coordination shortcomings in the value chain of planning, budgeting, procurement and delivery of LTSM to schools. However, the study also found a number of interesting trends in the coordination and management of LTSM that led to a turnaround, and these are:

- Political ownership of coordination mechanisms by the Minister in collaboration with MECs was an important milestone in tuning around LTSM coordination, from a crisis management mode to a planned service.
- The reform of policy governing coordination, improvement of information systems and knowledge management, as well as the strengthening of national and provincial coordination structures played a critical role.
- Strengthening of integrated cooperative governance system in which DBE monitors and supports provincial departments more effectively, was an important ingredient to development of a system of early warning signals of significant provincial government failures.
- Lack of policy instruments for standardized planning, budgeting, procurement and distribution of LTSM was the weak point in the system. The Department of Basic Education developed a national LTSM plan aimed at bringing coherence to planning and delivery of LTSM. The plan went beyond policy provisions to include mainstreaming of process standards, operational plans for procurement and delivery, as well as strengthened contract and risk management.

Mandates

LTSM delivery to schools is a concurrent responsibility of the DBE and Provincial Education Departments (PEDs), with no specific law or protocol assigning primary responsibility for coordination. However, in the process of resolving implementation hiccups, the sector has evolved a number of sector-specific mechanisms to manage national and provincial mandates. First, is an emerging consensus in the sector that public perceptions assign primary responsibility for coordination to the Minister and the DG by virtue of their norms and standards responsibility in education provisioning; as a result the Minister has increasingly played a leading role in overhauling coordination of the LTSM value chain.

Second, is a pragmatic ‘third way’ approach to mandates that espouses flexibility and responsiveness to policy implementation. The paradigm looks at mandates as multi-layered and multifaceted phenomenon, and the LTSM sector plan is a good example. The plan is essentially a series of mandates, with performance milestones and responsibilities, designed to provide comprehensive monitoring and reporting frameworks to both the DBE and PEDs.

Lastly, is a Council of Education Ministers (CEM) approach that discouraged the dichotomy of separation of powers between national and provincial in favour of a coordination framework that defines institutional arrangements across spheres. As a result fully fledged LTSM units are now in place, and a national coordinating LTSM committee has been established under the guidance of the director of LTSM.

Systems/ processes

The CEM has had to overhaul the coordination mechanisms over the last two years, and initiated major reforms in policy coordination, systems improvement, knowledge management, as well as the strengthening of coordination structures. The plan is applauded across the system for bringing about the much desired coherence and predictability to LTSM procurement and delivery. However, the reform process was not uncontested as some provinces viewed the reforms as meddling with their powers.

Critical policy promulgations included the realignment of the procurement process, rationalisation of prescribed titles to manage the quality of textbooks circulating in the public schooling system, promulgation of performance milestones that guide the LTSM procurement business process and its value chain, as well as standardisation of the procurement cycle to an 18 month turnaround time.

Coordination arrangements were streamlined in a way that keeps the LTSM delivery on the radar screen of both CEM and Headcom, and this gave rise to a threefold structure of CEM, Headcom and the Inter-Provincial (IP) LTSM committee. CEM makes policy decisions and focuses on resolving blockages . Headcom coordinates PED inputs and provides both vertical and horizontal coordination. The LTSM IP committee shares implementation models across provinces and identifies blockages to be up scaled to Headcom and CEM. Other systemic reforms that worked well include improvements to the reporting frameworks, information management systems and data veracity.

The new electronic reporting tools were adapted from the Auditor General's (AG's) dashboard reporting system used to manage high risk exposure. This allows DBE to get a bird's eye view of delivery progress per province with access to online reporting in real time. DBE is now working on a systems linkage project that will build an LTSM module into the electronic Schools Administration and Management System. The entire LTSM coordination reform has now become a success story of reforms which were piloted and then up-scaled to benefit the entire system. As a result, its use has been extended to improve coordination of infrastructure delivery, national examinations, and nutrition.

Conclusions

In conclusion, this case study has identified three useful success factors that have led to improved coordination of LTSM at DBE. First is **political ownership of coordination** by the Minister in collaboration with MECs. There is no doubt that the Minister at CEM gave clear signals to Headcom about important coordination issues to be closely managed with intensity. The Minister seems to have focussed CEM on strategic areas to be resolved and communicated priorities in no uncertain terms. Notwithstanding the profile generated by court litigations, the key ingredients to success seem to have been a clear vision, a plan and an execution strategy.

Second, is sensitivity to, and **prudent management of, the issue of concurrent powers**. Officials at DBE make the point that provinces' receptiveness to support efforts and willingness to partner with DBE is an important ingredient to successful coordination, by virtue of being implementing agents.

Third, in a context of concurrent powers, it is useful to have a specialised institutional arrangements (including **dedicated technical sub-structures**), a strong arm of provincial coordination, monitoring and support along the lines of the Accelerated Schools Infrastructure Initiative (ASIDI). DBE institutional arrangements were extremely limited when the Limpopo saga broke out.

Finally, where there is a clear national framework of collaboration between provinces, coordination improves and things get done.

3. Case study 3: Human Settlements Implementation Forum/ MinMEC: Accreditation of Metros with the Housing Function

Introduction

Towards the end of 2005, government endorsed the new plan to extend municipal powers to undertake the housing function in order to expedite housing delivery. Municipalities that are accredited will receive their transfers directly from national government and take over the administration of the housing function from provinces. They will administer and account for the grant, and be responsible for delivering on the housing mandate. So far the process for devolving the responsibility to municipalities that have capacity to carry out the function has been slow. In the period ahead the process needs to be accelerated so that provinces and national government can concentrate on supporting low capacity municipalities.

In this particular instance, the cluster involved is "Social", the implementation forum is "Outcome 8: Human Settlements", the structure being tested is the MinMEC and the issue being dealt with is the complex vertical transfer and assignment of the crucial function of accreditation of six identified metropolitan entities with the housing function.

Findings

In the case of the transfer of the housing function the respondents were generally of the opinion that the MinMEC played a crucially important role in facilitating the transfer of the function. However, it was pointed out that one of the key challenges to the process was related to the **behaviours** and **attitudes** of many of those participating in the debate. In many cases the assumption of responsibility of this challenging portfolio created what one respondent referred to as a "threat to the comfort zones of key participants". This statement implies that there was a reluctance on behalf of certain participants to relinquish their political mandates and powers, especially in a key deliverable such as housing provision, to lower levels of government such as municipalities.

The process of accreditation has been a long standing intention (commencing in 2005), but the actual realisation of this has taken some two years to steer through the MinMEC. It was pointed out that this forum was crucial in bringing together the key departments who play a role in human settlement development including the then Land Affairs, later Rural Development and those departments tasked with the provision of infrastructural services such as sanitation and water supply.

The other key element was the ability to assess whether the targeted local authorities had within their structures the necessary capacity to assume responsibility for the housing function. While it was noted that many of the provincial authorities were keen to transfer the function, the debate within the MinMEC raised a broader awareness regarding the differing levels of readiness of various local authorities to assume responsibility for this key function. This in turn gave rise to the need, prior to accreditation, to test the competence and capacity of municipalities to perform. The acid test was whether the assumption that the metros could manage and deliver the housing function was accurate.

The one issue that galvanized the use of MinMEC as an important forum with respect to harmonisation and working together on the accreditation of the metros was the change of emphasis when housing was transformed into human settlement development.

This event shifted the focus from a single measurement of housing delivery and measurement of performance based on quantities to a more qualitative, integrated and holistic approach. This shift highlighted the need for a broad based engagement with a range of associated departments.

In terms of **mandates,** it also highlighted the complications of driving a human settlements objective through a Housing Act and the need for a human settlements outcome to be steered through a national vision. The MinMEC provided a platform to share a collective understanding of the new mandate based on integrated human settlement objectives set by the National Department of Human Settlements (NDHS) and what was expected from the accrediting of delivery and management agents, in particular the municipalities, the provincial departments as well and other non-accredited departments such as environmental affairs. It also necessitated confronting the vexed issue of dealing with the reduction of provincial powers and managing the political challenge to this. As one respondent noted, "without ministerial support we would not have succeeded with implementing this change". The implication of this statement is that the Ministers involved in Human Settlements as well as ministers and MECs responsible for a number of complementary functional areas such as land availability, planning, local and cooperative governance and infrastructure worked together to ensure that not only the accreditation was facilitated but that the other components necessary to achieve the objective of "sustainable human settlements" were aligned. It speaks of political leadership bringing a range of stakeholders together in pursuit of a common cause, viz. the addressing of the spatial inequities within the urban environment.

The respondents were also more secure in their roles regarding the driving of human settlement issues and objectives through the MinMECs. They described their specific roles as to make sure that the proper process of accreditation is undertaken, is well managed, and is based on risk mitigation. This necessitated ensuring that the accreditation principles are complied with. It also required that the testing of the requisite capacity, as well as the "state of readiness" of accredited municipalities is rigorously undertaken and understood. This ensured that the preconditions for success of municipalities in assuming responsibility for the housing function were present.

Through the MinMEC structures, other parts of government were also able to embrace those municipalities that are accredited. In other words it provides leadership at a higher level so that other departments support the process and are able to better manage conflicts. At the end of the day it's the MECs that are then left with the final responsibility of deciding on accreditation and it's important to have their support and their analytical understanding of this particular process so that it doesn't lose its leadership quality when it gets implemented.

On the negative side respondents noted that the administrative aspect of the MinMEC was not up to the standard of, for example, private company secretariats. Their contention was that within private companies the committee secretariats are often sourced from within the corporate environment. As such, many have had direct experience of corporate protocols and procedures as well as an in-depth understanding of the finer details of the institution and its objectives and business practices. In certain instances, the secretariat's inability to comprehend or fully understand the often complex and intricate subject matter discussed at high level meetings, as reflected in subsequent minutes and records, tended to weaken the effectiveness of the structures ability to function at full capacity. Upscaling of skills in this area of deficiency was considered crucial by those interviewed for this case study.

The structuring of agendas to highlight the exact issues to be debated was also considered to be in need of improvement.

One respondent also felt that improved communication with regard to the accreditation process prior to it being presented at the MinMEC would have addressed some of the initial resistance to the proposal which subsequently consumed a lot of time at the MinMEC meetings and delayed the accreditation process.

According to those interviewed, MinMECs do have an important role to play in promoting Inter Governmental Relations (IGR), and a number of departments are attempting to address the deficiencies, many of which can be readily remedied through interventions such as training and on-going education especially on best practice for chairing meetings, time management and capacitation of support staff. However, a more effective means for promoting multi-sectoral coordination between MinMECs is clearly necessary if the present fragmented and uni-sectoral approach to policy formulation is to be overcome.

Conclusions

The general impression gained from those interviewed was that the accreditation of the metros was considered a success and an example of what can be achieved when the various participants work together.

One of the supporting factors was the fact that the sustainable human settlements policies were both defensible and credible, demanding a concerted effort to redress the ever increasing demand for better housing opportunities and improved urban environments, with better access to services, work opportunities and facilities. The underlying policy intentions were thus clear and generally supported.

As mentioned previously in this case study, those interviewed expressed their appreciation for the high levels of political commitment to the accreditation process and its intentions as well as the positive role played by those in leadership roles in facilitating the transfer of the housing function to the local authorities. This could be ascribed to the growing realisation amongst role players and participants that the function could be performed more effectively by the sphere of government closest to their constituents and recipients. This is not considered unique to the housing function, as it is generally conceded that the institutional knowledge of local and district municipalities regarding localised needs and conditions renders them more aligned to the delivery of national policy objectives and the servicing of their constituent populations. It has the added benefit of making such institutions accountable to those they serve and places an additional obligation on local councillors and decision makers to base their actions on real as opposed to perceived needs.

However a number of limitations, shortcomings and problems were identified related to the administrative aspects of the Human Settlement MinMEC emerged. These include:

- It is highly focused on the sector and pays insufficient attention to related functional areas. As a consequence the Human Settlement MinMEC tends to encourage the fragmentation of policy formulation. This is considered to be extremely problematic to the pursuit of sustainable human settlement objectives which rely heavily on cooperation with departments and ministries responsible for land release, planning and infrastructure.
- The large number of MinMEC meetings leads to either poor attendance or attendance by nominated lower ranking officials.
- The agenda is dominated by issues which in many cases could be dealt with more effectively by technical committees.

- The meetings are dominated by national government and do not really lend themselves to consensual decision-making.
- The management and/or chairing of meetings, the preparation and delivery of supporting documentation, and the conduct of proceedings are considered by those interviewed to be below par.
- There is a lack of clarity over the decision-making authority of the MinMEC and insufficient capacity to implement decisions.

4. Case study 4: Finalisation of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA): Environment MinMEC

Background

The focus of this case study is the **environmental impact assessment (EIA)** process and the role played by the environment MinMEC in this regard. There are two different focus areas with respect to EIA processes:

- Ensuring that there are clear EIA processes in place through ensuring that rules, regulations, and legislation are clear and consistent in their application both at national and provincial levels of government.
- Ensuring these clear and consistent EIA processes are actually implemented at national and provincial levels of government.

The focus of this case study is the former although by its nature the report also refers to the latter.

Findings

Mandates

Part A of Schedule four of the Constitution covers concurrent national and provincial functions and includes: 'Environment', 'Administration of Indigenous Forests' 'Nature Conservation, excluding national parks, national botanical gardens and marine resources' and 'Pollution control'.

There are eleven responsible authorities for the EIA process: the national Department of Environmental Affairs, the Department of Mineral Resources and nine provinces (including MECs), making this a complex area for coordination. According to one high level interviewee, the national Department of Environmental Affairs DG has a largely strategic role in the EIA process which focuses on ensuring that the overall EIA process is efficient and streamlined and does not delay much needed development.

The broad role of the MinMEC has been to deal with broad coordination issues at national level as well as to set policy in line with laws and regulations. The MinMEC also facilitates inter-provincial coordination and assistance.

The overarching purpose of the EIA process is to determine, assess and evaluate the consequences (positive and negative) of a proposed development, activity or product.

As regards the question as to which department is primarily responsible for EIAs, there was general consensus that this is the Department of Environmental Affairs, but of course the Department needs to work very closely with other departments.

The on-going protracted tensions between the respective roles of the Department of Environmental Affairs and the Department of Minerals around their respective mandates concerning the EIA process is a major coordination issue which is central to this case study.

Systems/processes

As regards the development of new regulations to better coordinate the respective roles of the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) and the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR), there has been good coordination at the MinMEC and MinTECH levels.

All EIA applications in the nine provinces are processed by the provincial department under which 'environment' falls, except for those activities that are of national significance, or those that straddle provincial borders and those where the provincial environmental department is the applicant. It should be noted however that the 'environment' function in the nine provinces falls into different departments resulting in a lack of cohesion in environmental MinMEC structures.

While there is general consensus that the EIA process has contributed overall to achieving sustainable development, it was pointed out that sustainability is unique to every region based on geographical and socio-ecological differences. Coordination to enhance service delivery is essential as well as shared learning experiences between provinces. It was further pointed out that sustainability can only successfully be achieved through acknowledging the specific socio-ecological and geographical differences and needs of the various regions in South Africa. For example different ecosystems and biomes provide unique challenges that cannot all be treated and approached in the same way in the EIA processes.

A number of weaknesses regarding environmental coordination structures were identified by key informants, including the fact that the committee for environmental coordination provided for in the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) is defunct; and the fact that the National Environmental Advisory Forum (NEAF) provided for in NEMA has been disbanded, thus losing an important mechanism to get civil society involved in environmental issues.

Poor coordination between law reform initiatives has resulted in a fragmented approach to environmental management and duplication in procedures and processes. More specifically the complexity of environmental management which is widely recognised as complicating coordination.

In the environmental area we are dealing with moving targets to some extent in that for example the plethora of renewable energy projects which have emerged in the last five to ten years was not foreseen a decade ago. As a result, the necessary legislation and policy documents are not in place.

Behaviours:

The only documented evidence of the role of the Environment MinMEC (in the form of relevant MinMEC decisions reflected in the Environment MinMEC meeting minutes made available to Impact Economix) was in a 5 April 2013 meeting minute and reads as follows:

> Ensure the urgent development of an EIA (and alternative instruments) awareness and education strategy aimed at local government, provincial EXCOs and departments, national departments, Presidential Infrastructure Coordinating Committee (PICC), etc. and supported by Base Document/Guideline explaining context, purpose, process, roles and responsibilities in EIA and provide information on efficiency and effectiveness interventions and innovation in impact management system.

The above minute reflects the role that the MinMEC is playing in ensuring improved communication and awareness of EIA regulations and processes.

The MinTECH seems to be operating well. In the words of one official: “it is at the MinTECH level that most EIA coordination efforts have been most successful.” A further success story described is the fact that water use license applicants must now take into account EIAs whereas this was not the case previously. This was as a direct result of the environmental MinTECHs. This illustrates the importantce of political leadership if coordination is to work effectively.

With regard to the question of whether formulation of EIA regulations is an example of good, poor or mixed government coordination the answer is definitely ‘mixed’. According to key informants, coordination within the EIA line departments (DEA and provincial environmental departments) has improved over the years. However, integration between EIA, waste management and air quality components could be improved. Cooperation between DEA and provinces on key issues such as shale gas and NEMA/mining interaction has been poor according to those interviewed for this case study.

Conclusions

This EIA case study has been an appropriate but somewhat complex case study to undertake due to a number of factors: the EIA has been around a relatively short time compared to other more traditional government functions; the fact that EIAs are being carried out in the context of concurrent national and provincial powers; the very nature of environmental concerns is all-pervasive and the notion of sustainable development is in reality the mandate of each and every government department at national and provincial levels. Be that as it may, this case study found that the coordination of service delivery in the environmental assessment process has made great strides in the last two decades.

Generally many examples were given of positive interaction and coordination, including the improved integration of environmental management systems, inclusive of EIA, into policies and strategies of all organs of state. According to one high level official a big difference could be made if there was an acknowledgement of the concurrent nature of the environmental management mandate to ensure meaningful deliberations on law reform initiatives and strategic issues, beyond mere consultation.

While overall coordination by the MinMEC as a whole can be rated as moderately successful a key area where EIA remains a challenge is in the mining sphere. While significant progress has been made with the current law reform initiative to move forward the proposed amendments to NEMA and MPRDA there is still room to improve the alignment between the statutes related to EIAs. The amendments to NEMA and the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Act 28 of 2002 (MPRDA) proposed the transfer of the environmental decision making mandate to the Department of Mineral Resources. Unfortunately the transfer of decision making mandates (to mining) and the centralisation of decision making (e.g. NEMA and infrastructure bill) is an inappropriate response to this challenge. This issue is being included in an evaluation of environmental governance in the 2014/15 National Evaluation Plan.